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ABSTRACT    This paper examines the optimal response of monetary and 
fiscal policy to a decline in aggregate demand. The theoretical framework is a 
two-period general equilibrium model in which prices are sticky in the short 
run and flexible in the long run. Policy is evaluated by how well it raises the 
welfare of the representative household. Although the model has Keynesian 
features, its policy prescriptions differ significantly from those of textbook 
Keynesian analysis. Moreover, the model suggests that the commonly used 
“bang for the buck” calculations are potentially misleading guides for the 
welfare effects of alternative fiscal policies.
w
hat is the optimal response of monetary and fiscal policy to an 
economy-wide decline in aggregate demand? This question has 
been at the forefront of many economists’ minds for decades, but especially 
over the past few years. In the aftermath of the housing bust, financial crisis, 
and stock market decline of the late 2000s, households and firms were less 
eager to spend. The decline in aggregate demand for goods and services led 
to the most severe recession in a generation or more.
The textbook answer to such a situation is for policymakers to use the 
tools of monetary and fiscal policy to prop up aggregate demand. And, 
indeed, during this recent episode the Federal Reserve reduced the federal 
funds rate, its primary policy instrument, almost all the way to zero. With 
monetary policy having used up its ammunition of interest rate cuts, econo-
mists and policymakers increasingly looked elsewhere for a solution. In 
particular, they focused on fiscal policy and unconventional instruments of 
monetary policy.
Traditional Keynesian economics suggests a startlingly simple solution: 
the government can increase its spending to make up for the shortfall in 
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private spending. Indeed, this was one of the motivations for the stimulus 
package proposed by President Barack Obama and passed by Congress 
in early 2009. The logic behind this policy should be familiar to anyone 
who has taken a macroeconomics principles course anytime over the past 
half century.
Yet many Americans (including quite a few congressional Republicans) are 
skeptical that increased government spending is the right policy response. 
Their skepticism is motivated by some basic economic and political ques-
tions: If we as individual citizens are feeling poorer and cutting back on 
our spending, why should our elected representatives in effect reverse these 
private decisions by increasing spending and going into debt on our behalf? 
If the goal of government is to express the collective will of the citizenry, 
shouldn’t it follow the lead of those it represents by tightening its own belt?
Traditional Keynesians have a standard answer to this line of thinking. 
According to the paradox of thrift, increased saving may be individually 
rational but collectively irrational. As individuals try to save more, they 
depress aggregate demand and thus national income. In the end, saving might 
not increase at all. Increased thrift might lead only to depressed economic 
activity, a malady that can be remedied by an increase in government pur-
chases of goods and services.
The goal of this paper is to address this set of issues in light of modern 
macroeconomic theory. Unlike traditional Keynesian analysis of fiscal policy, 
modern macro theory begins with the preferences and constraints facing 
households and firms and builds from there. This feature of modern theory 
is not a mere fetish for microeconomic foundations. Instead, it allows policy 
prescriptions to be founded on the basic principles of welfare economics. 
This feature seems particularly important for the case at hand, because the 
Keynesian recommendation is to have the government undo the actions 
that private citizens are taking on their own behalf. Figuring out whether 
such a policy can improve the well-being of those citizens is the key issue, 
and a task that seems impossible to address without some reliable measure 
of welfare.
The model we develop to address this question fits solidly in the New 
Keynesian tradition. That is, the starting point for the analysis is an inter-
temporal general equilibrium model that assumes prices to be sticky in 
the short run. This temporary price rigidity prevents the economy from 
reaching an optimal allocation of resources, thus giving monetary and 
fiscal policy a possible role in helping the economy reach a better allo-
cation through their influence on aggregate demand. The model yields 
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under various economic conditions and constraints on the set of policy 
tools at their disposal.
To be sure, by the nature of this kind of exercise, the validity of any 
conclusion depends on whether the model captures the essence of the 
problem being examined. Because all models are simplifications, one can 
always question whether a conclusion is robust to generalization. Our strategy 
is to begin with a simple model that illustrates our approach and yields 
some stark results. We then generalize this baseline model along several 
dimensions, both to check its robustness and to examine a broader range 
of policy issues. Inevitably, any policy conclusions from such a theoretical 
exploration must be tentative. In the final section we discuss some of the 
simplifications we make that might be relaxed in future work.
Our baseline model is a two-period general equilibrium model with 
sticky prices in the first period. The available policy tools are monetary 
policy and government purchases of goods and services. Like private con-
sumption goods, government purchases yield utility to households. Private 
and public consumption are not, however, perfect substitutes. Our goal is 
to examine the optimal use of the tools of monetary and fiscal policy when 
the economy finds itself producing below potential because of insufficient 
aggregate demand.
We begin with the benchmark case in which the economy does not 
face the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. In this case the only 
stabilization tool that is necessary is conventional monetary policy. Once 
monetary policy is set to maintain full employment, fiscal policy should 
be determined based on classical principles. In particular, government con-
sumption should be set to equate its marginal benefit with the marginal 
benefit of private consumption. As a result, when private citizens are cutting 
back on their private consumption spending, the government should cut 
back on public consumption as well.
We then examine the complications that arise because nominal interest 
rates cannot be set below zero. We show that even this constraint on monetary 
policy does not by itself give traditional fiscal policy a role as a stabilization 
tool. Instead, the optimal policy is for the central bank to commit to future 
monetary policy actions in order to increase current aggregate demand. 
Fiscal policy continues to be set on classical principles.
A role for countercyclical fiscal policy might arise if the central bank 
both hits the zero lower bound on the current short-term interest rate and 
is unable to commit itself to expansionary future policy. In this case mon-
etary policy cannot maintain full employment of productive resources 
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nonclassical short-run equilibrium. Optimal fiscal policy then looks decidedly 
Keynesian if the only instrument of fiscal policy is the level of govern-
ment purchases: increase those purchases to increase the demand for idle 
productive resources, even if the marginal value of the public goods being 
purchased is low.
This very Keynesian result, however, is overturned once the set of fis-
cal tools available to policymakers is expanded. Optimal fiscal policy in 
this situation is one that tries to replicate the allocation of resources that 
would be achieved if prices were flexible. An increase in government pur-
chases cannot accomplish that goal: although it can yield the same level 
of national income, it cannot achieve the same composition of it. We 
discuss how tax instruments might be used to induce a better allocation 
of resources. The model suggests that tax policy should aim at increasing 
the level of investment spending. Something like an investment tax credit 
comes to mind. In essence, optimal fiscal policy in this situation tries to 
produce incentives similar to what would be achieved if the central bank 
were somehow able to reduce interest rates below zero.
A final implication of the baseline model is that the traditional fiscal 
policy multiplier may well be a poor tool for evaluating the welfare impli-
cations of alternative fiscal policies. It is common in policy circles to judge 
alternative stabilization ideas using “bang-for-the-buck” calculations. That 
is, fiscal options are judged according to how many dollars of extra GDP 
are achieved for each dollar of extra deficit spending. But such calculations 
ignore the composition of GDP and therefore are potentially misleading as 
measures of welfare.
After developing these results in our baseline model, we examine three 
variations. First, we add a third period. We show how the central bank can 
use long-term interest rates as an additional tool to achieve the flexible-price 
equilibrium. Second, we add government investment spending to the base-
line model. We show that all government expenditure follows classical 
principles when monetary policy is sufficient to stabilize output. More-
over, even when monetary policy is limited, the model does not point 
toward government investment as a particularly useful tool for putting idle 
resources to work. Third, we modify the baseline model to include non-
Ricardian, rule-of-thumb households who consume a constant fraction of 
income. The presence of such households means that the timing of taxes 
may affect output, and we characterize the optimal policy mix in that setting. 
We find that the description of the equilibrium closely resembles the tradi-
tional Keynesian model, but the prescription for optimal policy can differ 
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I.  Introducing the Model
In this section we introduce the elements of the baseline model. Before 
delving into the model’s details, it may be useful to describe how this 
model is related to a few other models with which readers may be familiar. 
Our goal is not to provide a completely new model of stabilization policy 
but rather to illustrate conventional mechanisms in a way that permits an 
easier and more transparent analysis of the welfare implications of alterna-
tive policies.
First, the model is closely related to the model of short-run fluctuations 
found in most leading undergraduate textbooks. Students are taught that 
prices are sticky in the short run but flexible in the long run. As a result, the 
economy can temporarily deviate from its full-employment equilibrium, 
yet over time it gravitates toward full employment. Similarly, we will (in a 
later section) impose a sticky price level in the first period but allow future 
prices to be flexible.
Second, this model is closely related to the large literature on dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Strictly speaking, the model 
is not stochastic: we will solve for the deterministic path of the economy 
after one (or more) of the exogenous variables changes. But the spirit of the 
model is much the same. As in DSGE models, all decisions are founded on 
underlying preferences and technology. Moreover, all decisionmakers are 
forward looking, so their actions will depend not only on current policy but 
also on the policy they expect to prevail in the future.
There is, however, a key methodological difference between our approach 
and that in the DSGE literature. In recent years that literature has evolved in 
the direction of greater complexity, as researchers have attempted to match 
various moments of the data more closely. (See, for example, Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005 and Smets and Wouters 2003.) By contrast, 
our goal is greater simplicity and transparency so that the welfare implications 
of alternative monetary and fiscal policies can be better illuminated.
Third,  the  model  we  examine  is  related  to  the  older  literature  on   
“general disequilibrium” models, such as those of Robert Barro and Herschel 
Grossman (1971) and Edmond Malinvaud (1977). As in these models, we 
will assume that the price level in the first period is exogenously stuck at 
a level that is inconsistent with full employment of productive resources. 
At the prevailing price level, there will be an excess supply of goods. But 
unlike this earlier literature, our model is explicitly dynamic. That is, we 
emphasize the role of forward-looking, intertemporal behavior in determin-
ing current spending decisions and the impact of policy.214  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
I.A.  Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households. 
The representative household has the following objective function:
( ) max , 1 1 1 2 2 u C v G u C v G ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) [ ] { } β
where Ct is consumption in period t, Gt is government purchases, and b is 
the discount factor. Households choose consumption but take government 
purchases as given.
Households derive all their income from their ownership of firms. Each 
household’s consumption choices are limited by a present-value budget 
constraint:
( ) , 2
1
0 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
P T C
P T C
i
Π
Π
− − ( ) +
− − ( )
+ ( )
=
where Pt is the price level, Pt is profits of the firm, Tt is tax payments, and i1 
is the nominal interest rate between the first and second periods. Implicit in 
this budget constraint is the assumption of a bond market in which house-
holds can borrow or lend at the market interest rate.
I.B.  Firms
Firms do all the production in the economy and provide all household 
income. It is easiest to imagine that the number of firms is the same as the 
number of households and that each household owns one firm.
For simplicity, we assume that capital K is the only factor of production. 
In each period the firm produces output with an AK production function, 
where A is an exogenous technological parameter. The firm begins with an 
endowment of capital K1 and is able to borrow and lend in financial markets 
to determine the future capital stock K2. Without loss of generality, we assume 
that capital fully depreciates each period, so investment in the first period 
equals the capital stock in the second period.
The parameter A plays a key role in our analysis. In particular, we are 
interested in studying the optimal policy response to a decline in aggre-
gate demand, and in our model the most natural cause of such a decline is 
a decrease in the future value of A. Such an event can be described as a 
decline in expected growth, a fall in confidence, or a pessimistic shock to 
“animal spirits.” In any event, in our model it will tend to reduce wealth 
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(that is, the real interest rate consistent with full employment). A similar set 
of events would unfold if the shock were to households’ discount factor b, 
but it seems more natural to assume stable household preferences and 
changes in the expected technology available to firms.
Before proceeding, it might be worth commenting on the absence of a 
labor input in the model. That omission is not crucial. As we will describe 
more fully later, it could be remedied by giving each household an endow-
ment of labor in each period and making the simplifying assumption that 
capital and labor are perfect substitutes in production. That somewhat more 
general model yields identical results regarding monetary and fiscal policy. 
Therefore, to keep the results as clean and easily interpretable as possible, 
we will focus on the one-factor case.
Firms choose the second period’s capital stock to maximize the present 
value of profits, discounting the second period’s nominal profit by the nom-
inal interest rate:
max .
K P
P
i 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
Π
Π
+
+ ( )






Profits are
( ) , 3 Πt t t Y I = −
where Yt is equilibrium aggregate output and It is investment. Because capital 
fully depreciates each period, investment in the first period becomes the 
capital stock in the second period:
( ) . 4 2 1 K I =
Recall that the initial capital stock K1 is given. Also, because there is no 
third period, there is no investment in the second period (I2 = 0).
As noted above, the model has a simple AK production function:
F A K A K t t t t , , ( ) =
with At > 0.
Finally, it is important to note an assumption implicit in this statement of 
the firm’s optimization problem: The firm is assumed to sell all of its output 
at the going price, and it is assumed to buy investment goods at the going 
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nor is it allowed to produce consumption goods directly for the household 
that owns it. This restriction is irrelevant in the case of fully flexible prices, 
but it will matter in the case of sticky prices, where firms may be demand 
constrained. In that case this assumption prevents the firm from directly 
circumventing the normal inefficiencies that arise from sticky prices. In 
practice, such a restriction arises naturally because firms are specialists in 
producing highly differentiated goods. Because we do not formally incor-
porate product differentiation in our analysis, it makes sense to impose this 
restriction as an additional constraint on the firm’s behavior.
I.C.  The Money Market and Monetary Policy
Households are required to hold money to purchase consumption goods. 
The money market in this economy is assumed to be described by the fol-
lowing quantity equation:
t t t PC = φ .
That is, money holdings are proportional to nominal consumer spending. 
The parameter f reflects the efficiency of the monetary system; a small f 
implies a high velocity of money. We tend to think of f as being very small, 
which is why we ignore the cost of holding money in the households’ bud-
get constraint above. The limiting case as f approaches zero is sometimes 
called a “cashless” economy.
Hereafter, it will prove useful to define
Mt
t =

φ
,
which implies the conventional money market equilibrium condition:
M PC t t t = .
M can be interpreted either as the money supply adjusted for the money 
demand parameter f or as the determinant of nominal consumer spending.
Money earns a nominal rate of return of zero. When the nominal interest 
rate on bonds is positive, money is a dominated asset, and households will 
hold only what is required for transactions purposes, as determined above. 
However, they could choose to hold more (in which case Mt > PtCt). This 
possibility prevents the nominal interest rate in the bond market from fall-
ing below zero.n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  217
Because there are two periods, there are two policy variables to be set 
by the central bank. In the first period, the central bank is assumed to set the 
nominal interest rate i1, subject to the zero lower bound. It allows that peri-
od’s money supply M1 to adjust to whatever is demanded in the economy’s 
equilibrium. In the second period, the central bank sets the money supply M2. 
(Recall that there is no interest rate in the second period, because there is 
no third period.) One can think of the current interest rate i1 as the central 
bank’s short-run policy instrument and the future money supply M2 as the 
long-run nominal anchor.
I.D.  Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy in each period is described by two variables: Gt is govern-
ment purchases in period t, and Tt is lump-sum tax revenue. (In a later section 
we introduce an investment subsidy as an additional fiscal policy tool.) It 
will prove useful to define gt, the share of government purchases in full-
employment output:
( ) . 5 g
G
AK
t
t
t t
=
Any deficits are funded by borrowing in the bond market at the market 
interest rate. The government’s budget constraint is
( ) . 6
1
0 1 1 1
2 2 2
1
P T G
P T G
i
− ( ) +
− ( )
+
=
Note that because households are forward looking and have the same time 
horizon as the government, this model will be fully Ricardian: the timing 
of tax payments is neutral. In a later section we generalize the model to 
include some non-Ricardian behavior.
I.E.  Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
Output is used for consumption, investment, and government purchases:
( ) . 7 Y C I G t t t t = + +
Equilibrium aggregate output is also constrained by potential output:
( ) . 8 Y AK t t t ≤218  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
In the full-employment equilibrium, this last expression holds with equality. 
However, we are particularly interested in cases in which this expression 
holds as a strict inequality. In these cases aggregate demand is insufficient 
to employ all productive resources, and monetary and fiscal policy can 
potentially remedy the problem. The key issue is the optimal use of these 
policy tools.
II.  The Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
The natural place to start in analyzing the model is with the behavior of 
the firms and households, as well as optimal policy, for the case of flexible 
prices. The flexible-price equilibrium will provide the benchmark when we 
impose sticky prices in the next section.
II.A.  Firm and Household Behavior
We first derive the equations characterizing the equilibrium decisions 
of the private sector (households and firms), taking government policy as 
given. We start with firms. In this setting, prices adjust to guarantee full 
employment in each period. Therefore,
( ) , . 9 Y AK t t t t = for all
The firm’s profit maximization problem can be restated, using the full-
employment condition (equation 9) and the investment equation (equa-
tion 4), as
max .
K P AK K
P
i
A K
2
1 1 1 2
2
1
2 2 1
− ( ) +
+ ( )






This yields the following first-order condition:
( ) . 10 1 1 2
2
1
+ ( ) = i A
P
P
Expression 10 is similar to a conventional Fisher equation: the nominal 
interest rate reflects the marginal productivity of capital and the equilib-
rium inflation rate.n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  219
The household’s utility maximization yields the standard intertemporal 
Euler equation:
( ) . 11 1
1
2
1
1
2
′( )
′( )
= + ( )
u C
u C
i
P
P β
The full-employment condition (equation 9) and the accounting identity for 
aggregate output (equation 7) imply the following values for consumption:
( ) 12 1 1 1 2 1 C AK K G = − −
( ) . 13 2 2 2 2 C A K G = −
Equations 10 through 13 simultaneously determine the equilibrium for four 
endogenous variables: C1, C2, K2, and P2/P1. The second-period money market 
equilibrium condition (M2 = P2C2) then pins down P2 and thereby P1.
To derive explicit solutions for the economy’s equilibrium, we specify 
the household’s utility function as isoelastic
u C
C
t
t ( ) =
−
−
−

 

  1
1
1
1
1
σ
σ
,
where s is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The equilibrium real quantities are:
( ) 14
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2 2
2
2
C
A
A g
A
A
=

 

  − ( )
+

 

  −
β
β
σ
σ
g g
A K G
2
1 1 1
( )
− ( )
( ) 15
1
1
1
1
2
2 2
2
2 2
1 1 1 C
A g
A
A g
A K G =
− ( )
+

 

  − ( )
−
β
σ ( ( )
( ) 16
1
1
1
1
1
2
2 2
1 1 1 I
A
A g
A K G =
+

 

  − ( )
− ( )
β
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( ) 17 1 1 1 Y A K =
( ) . 18
1
1
1
2
2
2
2 2
1 1 1 Y
A
A
A g
AK G =
+

 

  − ( )
− ( )
β
σ
The equilibrium nominal quantities are
( ) 19
1
1
1
1
1
2
2 2
2 1 1 1
P
A
A g
g A K G
=
+

 

  − ( )
− ( ) − ( )
β
σ
M M
i
2
1 1 + ( )
( ) 20
1
1
1
1
2
2
2 2
2 2 1 1 1
P
A
A g
A g A K G
=
+

 

  − ( )
− ( ) −
β
σ
( ( )
M2
( ) . 21
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
M
A
A
M
i
=

 

  + ( ) β
σ
Note that the economy exhibits monetary neutrality. That is, the monetary 
policy instruments do not affect any of the real variables. Expansionary 
monetary policy, as reflected in either lower i1 or higher M2, implies a higher 
price level P1.
As already mentioned, we are interested in studying the effects of a 
decline in aggregate demand. Such a shock, which can be thought of most 
naturally as some exogenous event leading to a decline in the private sec-
tor’s desire to spend, can be incorporated into this kind of model in various 
ways. One that is often used is to assume a shock to the intertemporal dis-
count rate (which here would be an increase in b). Alternatively, a decline 
in spending desires can arise because of a decrease in A2, the productivity 
of technology projected to prevail in the future. The impact of A2 on current 
demand depends crucially on s, which in turn governs the relative size of 
income and substitution effects from a change in the rate of return. If s < 1, 
the income effect dominates the substitution effect, and a lower A2 primarily 
causes households to feel poorer, inducing a reduction in desired consump-
tion. Hereafter, we focus on the case of a decline in A2 together with the 
maintained assumption that s < 1. This is, of course, not the only way one 
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approximation in this model to what one might call a decline in confidence 
or an adverse shift in “animal spirits.”
Equations 14 to 21 above show what a decline in A2 does to all the 
endogenous variables in the flexible-price equilibrium. Consumption falls 
because households are poorer. Their higher saving translates into higher 
investment. Output in the first period remains the same. The flexibility 
of the price level is crucial for this result. Equation 19 shows that a fall 
in A2 leads to a fall in the price level P1. In section III we will examine 
the case in which the price level is sticky and thus unable to respond to 
this shock.
II.B.  Optimal Fiscal Policy under Flexible Prices
Optimal fiscal policy follows classical principles. We state the govern-
ment’s optimization problem formally in a later section, but in words, it 
chooses public expenditure Gt and taxes Tt to maximize household utility 
subject to the economy’s feasibility and the government’s budget constraints. 
The following conditions define optimal government purchases:
( ) 22 1 2 2 ′( ) = ′( ) v G A v G β
( ) . 23 ′( ) = ′( ) u C v G t t t for all
Equation 23 shows that optimal fiscal policy has government purchases 
move in the same direction as private consumption, unless there is a change 
in preferences for government services.
To derive explicit solutions, we assume that the utility from government 
purchases takes a form similar to that from consumption:
v G
G
t
t ( ) =
−
−
−

 

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θ
σ
σ
σ
1
1
1
1
1
1
,
where q is a taste parameter. These expressions imply optimal government 
purchases:
G C 1 1 = θ
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and therefore the following equilibrium quantities in closed form:
( ) 24
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1 1
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This flexible-price equilibrium with optimal fiscal policy will be a natural 
benchmark in the analysis that follows.n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  223
II.C.  An Aside on Labor
As mentioned earlier, it is possible to incorporate labor as an additional 
factor of production without affecting the key results of the model. Sup-
pose that the production function is
Y A K L t t t t t = + ( ) ω ,
where wt is an exogenous labor productivity parameter and Lt is the 
exogenous level of labor supplied inelastically to the firm by the represen-
tative household. With this production function, the baseline model is more 
cumbersome but little changed. In essence, current and future labor inputs 
serve as additions to the initial productive endowment of the household, 
funding consumption and government purchases just as does K1. None of 
the policy analysis would be altered by adding labor input in this way. 
Interested readers are referred to a technical appendix available both at the 
Brookings Papers website and at the authors’ personal websites.1
If, contrary to what the above production function assumes, labor and 
capital were not perfect substitutes in production, more details about factor 
markets would need to be specified. In particular, firms facing insufficient 
demand would have to choose between idle labor and idle capital in some 
way. We suspect that this issue is largely unrelated to the topics at hand, 
and so we avoid these additional complexities. Hereafter, we maintain the 
assumption of a single input into production.
III.  The Equilibrium under Short-Run Sticky Prices
So far we have introduced a two-period general equilibrium model with 
monetary and fiscal policy and solved for the equilibrium under the assump-
tion that prices are flexible in both periods. In this section we use the model 
to analyze what happens if prices are sticky in the short run. In particular, 
we take the short-run price level P1 to be fixed, while allowing the long-run 
price level P2 to remain flexible.
The cause of the price stickiness will not be modeled here, and the 
reason for the deviation of prices from equilibrium prices will not enter our 
analysis. It seems natural to imagine that prices were set in advance based 
on economic conditions that were expected to prevail and that conditions 
1.  Online appendixes to papers in this issue may be found on the Brookings Papers 
webpage (www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/past_editions.aspx).224  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
turned out differently than expected. Equation 19 shows what determines 
the price level consistent with full employment. If any of the exogenous 
variables in this equation are other than what was anticipated, and the price 
level is unable to change, the economy will be forced to deviate from the 
classical flexible-price equilibrium. One notable possibility, for instance, is 
fluctuations in A2, which we have interpreted as reflecting confidence about 
future economic growth.
With a fixed price level, there are two cases to consider: the price level 
can be stuck too low, or it can be stuck too high. If the price level is too 
low, the goods market will experience excess demand. Such a situation is 
sometimes called “repressed inflation.” If the price level is too high, the 
goods market will experience excess supply. In this case, which might be 
called the “Keynesian regime,” firms will be unable to sell all they want at 
the going price, and so some productive resources will be left idle. Because 
our goal is to understand optimal policy during recessions, our analysis will 
focus on this latter case.2
Formally, the equations describing the sticky-price equilibrium closely 
resemble equations 9 through 13 from the flexible-price model. One differ-
ence is that because nominal rigidity prevents full employment of capital 
in the first period, equation 9, Yt = AtKt, may not hold for t = 1. Moreover, 
A1K1 needs to be replaced with Y1 in equation 12, which now becomes
C Y K G 1 1 2 1 = − − .
Of course, the presence of a sticky price level in the first period breaks 
the monetary neutrality of the flexible-price model. Here, monetary policy 
affects the real economy’s equilibrium quantities.
The equilibrium of this model is described by the following equations:
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2.  As an aside, we note that much of the New Keynesian literature makes this case 
canonical, and precludes the case of repressed inflation, by assuming monopolistic competition. 
Firms in such industries charge prices above marginal cost and, as long as prices are not too 
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Equation 34 can be viewed as an aggregate demand curve. It yields a 
negative relationship between output Y1 and the price level P1.
This set of equations also yields another famous Keynesian result: the 
paradox of thrift. If b rises, households will want to consume less and save 
more. In equilibrium, however, saving and investment are unchanged, 
because output falls. That is, because aggregate demand influences output, 
more thriftiness does not increase equilibrium saving.
Note that all the real equilibrium quantities above depend on the ratio
( ) . 37
1
2
1 1
M
i P + ( )
Expression 37 succinctly captures the policy position of the central bank. 
It also hints at our findings detailed below, where we show that the various 
tools available to the central bank can act as substitutes.
In this setting, the monetary policy that generates full employment can 
be read directly from equation 34 by equating Y1 with A1K1:
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To maintain full employment, monetary policy needs to respond to present 
and future technology, present and future fiscal policy, and household 
preferences.226  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
To illustrate the implications of this solution, consider the impact of 
a negative shock to future technology A2. (We maintain the assumption 
that s < 1.) In the absence of a policy response, the effect on the economy’s 
short-run equilibrium can be seen immediately from equations 31 through 36. 
Consumption falls in both periods. Output falls in the second period, even 
though the economy is at full employment, as worse technology reduces 
potential output in that period. Most important for our purposes, output 
falls in the first period because of weak aggregate demand. Potential output 
in the first period is unchanged because A1 and K1 are fixed. Thus, a decline 
in “confidence” as reflected in the fall in A2 causes resources in the first 
period to become idle.
IV.    Optimal Policy When Monetary Policy Is Sufficient  
to Restore the Flexible-Price Equilibrium
In this section we begin to examine optimal policy responses to a drop 
in aggregate demand. For concreteness, we focus on a negative shock 
to future technology A2. Formally, let a caret over a variable denote the 
value of that variable anticipated when prices were set. We assume that 
the price level was set to achieve full employment based on an expected 
value Â2, but once prices are set, the actual realized value is A2, where 
A2 < Â2. We begin with conventional monetary policy, where the central 
bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate, and derive the threshold 
value for A2 above which conventional monetary policy is sufficient to 
replicate the flexible-price equilibrium. We also characterize optimal fiscal 
policy in this scenario. Then we examine the options for monetary policy 
when A2 falls further and the economy hits the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates.
Whenever  monetary  policy  is  sufficient  to  restore  the  flexible-price 
equilibrium, optimal fiscal policy follows classical principles, satisfying 
equation 23 from the flexible-price equilibrium. Therefore, the postshock 
equilibrium with optimal fiscal policy can be summarized with the follow-
ing set of equations:
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Optimal monetary policy is implied by equation 42 and the full-employment   
condition Y1 = A1K1:
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In our canonical case in which s < 1, a fall in A2 raises the right-hand side 
of this expression. Thus, a decline in confidence about the future causes 
optimal monetary policy to be more expansionary, as reflected in either 
a fall in the short-term nominal interest rate i1 or an increase in the future 
money supply M2.
IV.A.  Conventional Monetary Policy
The conventional monetary policy response to weak aggregate demand 
is to lower i1. For now, assume that this conventional response is the central 
bank’s only response, so that the long-term money supply remains at its 
preshock level (that is, M2 = M ˆ
2). Fiscal policy is at its classical optimum 
derived above. With these assumptions we can rearrange equation 46 and 228  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
substitute it along with i1 into equation 42 and solve for first-period output 
after the shock:
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Manipulating equation 47 yields a threshold value for A2 above which 
conventional policy is sufficient to restore the flexible-price equilibrium. 
We denote this threshold A2conventional, and it is
( )
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
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Note that a higher initial value of i ˆ
1 implies a lower threshold A2conventional. 
This result parallels much recent discussion suggesting that higher normal 
levels of nominal interest rates would increase the scope for conventional 
monetary responses to adverse demand shocks (see, for example, Blanchard, 
Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 2010). To show this clearly, note that if i ˆ
1 = 0, this 
expression reduces to
A A 2conventional = ˆ . 2
That is, if the nominal interest rate is normally zero, then conventional 
monetary policy has no power in response to an adverse shock.
The value of the short-term interest rate i1 that generates full employment 
satisfies
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At this value of the interest rate, consumption, investment, and output all 
equal their values in the flexible-price equilibrium.
The limiting case in which s approaches zero may be instructive. In this 
case equation 49 simplifies to
( ) ˆ
ˆ . 50 1
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Thus, when our measure of confidence A2 falls below what was anticipated 
when prices were set, the nominal interest rate must move in the same 
direction. How far A2 can fall before the central bank hits the zero lower 
bound depends solely on the normal interest rate i ˆ
1.
IV.B.  Long-Term Monetary Expansion
If A2 falls below A2conventional, the central bank will be unable to achieve the 
flexible-price equilibrium with conventional monetary policy. As recent 
events have shown, monetary authorities may look beyond conventional 
policy in this situation. One much-discussed option is to try to affect the 
long-term nominal interest rate. We consider that option in a later section, 
where we specify a variation on this baseline model in which the economy 
has three periods, not two.
In this baseline model, the central bank has one tool other than the short-
term interest rate: the long-term level of the money supply M2. Equation 42 
implies that any shock to future technology can be fully offset by changes 
to M2. Formally, the value of M2 required to restore the flexible-price equi-
librium after the shock A2 < A2conventional when i1 = 0 satisfies
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Note that the right-hand side of equation 51 is decreasing in A2, so that 
(as expected) a large negative shock to future technology calls for a long-
term nominal expansion.3
3.  The role of future monetary policy in influencing the short-run equilibrium has, of course, 
been widely discussed. See, for example, Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003).230  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
IV.C.    Summary of Optimal Policy When Monetary Policy  
Is Unrestricted
A sufficiently flexible and credible monetary policy is always sufficient 
to stabilize output following an adverse demand shock, even if the zero 
lower bound on the short-term interest rate binds. Once monetary policy has 
restored the flexible-price equilibrium, the role of fiscal policy is entirely pas-
sive and is determined by classical principles that equate the marginal utility 
of government purchases to the marginal utility of private consumption.
One noteworthy, and perhaps surprising, result concerns the influence 
of these expansionary moves in monetary policy on inflation. In this model 
the current price level P1 is fixed, but equation 36 shows how monetary 
policy influences the future price level P2. A cut in the short-term nominal 
interest rate i1 reduces the future price level. The explanation is that the 
lower interest rate stimulates investment and increases future potential 
output; for any given future money supply M2, higher potential output 
means a lower price level. Similarly, an increase in M2 does not raise the 
future price level because it stimulates current output and investment; the 
increase in future potential output offsets the inflationary pressure of a 
greater money supply. Thus, although the various tools of monetary policy 
can increase aggregate demand and output in this economy, they do not 
increase future inflation until the economy reaches full employment.
Of course, as has been made clear in recent debates over U.S. monetary 
policy, the ability of the central bank to fulfill its potential is vulnerable to 
real-world constraints on policymaking. The central bank may not be will-
ing or able to commit to the expansionary long-term money supply M2 that 
is required for stabilization. As a consequence, monetary policy may be 
insufficient to restore the flexible-price equilibrium, raising the question of 
whether and how fiscal policy might supplement it. We turn to that question 
in the next section.
V.  Optimal Fiscal Policy When Monetary Policy Is Restricted
Imagine an economy that has been hit by an adverse shock to A2. The central 
bank has set i1 = 0, but that policy move has been insufficient to restore 
output to full employment. In addition, imagine that the central bank is for 
some reason unable to commit to an expansion of the future money supply M2. 
(In the notation of the previous section, this implies A2 < A2conventional, i1 = 0, 
and M2 = M ˆ
2.) How might fiscal policy respond to such a scenario?
We consider two fiscal stimulus policies in this section, each intended 
to raise one of the components of aggregate demand. First, we consider n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  231
an increase in G1, government purchases in the first period. Second, we 
examine a subsidy s aimed at boosting first-period investment I1. Both of 
these policies are financed by an increase in lump-sum taxes. The timing of 
these taxes is immaterial because we have assumed that all households are 
forward looking. In a later section we relax the assumption of completely 
forward-looking households. As the households in that example choose con-
sumption in part based on a rule of thumb tied to current disposable income, 
adjusting the timing of taxes has the potential to raise consumption C1.4
V.A.  The Government’s Fiscal Policy Problem
In this scenario the government faces the following optimization problem:
max
, , G T s t t t
u C v G u C v G
{ } = { }
( ) + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) [
1
2 1 1 2 2 β ] ] { },
where s is an investment subsidy such that the cost of one unit of investment 
to a firm in the first period is (1 - s), and the values for {C1, C2, K2} as a 
function of government policies are chosen optimally by households and 
firms. The government is constrained by the following balanced-budget 
condition:
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Some of the equations that determined equilibrium in the model of section 
II must be altered to take into account the investment subsidy. Equation 10, 
which results from the firm’s profit maximization, becomes
( ) , 53 1 1 1 2
2
1
− ( ) + ( ) = s i A
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P
and the government budget constraint (equation 6) becomes equation 52.
4.  One can imagine other fiscal instruments as well. In particular, a retail sales tax   
(or subsidy) naturally comes to mind. The effects of such an instrument in this model depend 
on what price is assumed to be sticky. If the before-tax price is sticky, then a sales tax gives 
policymakers the ability to control directly the after-tax price, which is the price relevant for 
demand. This in turn allows policymakers to overcome all the inefficiencies that arise from 
sticky prices. After a decline in aggregate demand, a cut in the sales tax can reduce prices to 
the level consistent with full employment. On the other hand, if the after-tax price is assumed 
to be sticky, then a sales tax has no use as a short-run stabilization tool.232  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
We begin with the simplest fiscal stimulus: an increase in current gov-
ernment purchases G1. For now we set the investment subsidy s to zero. But 
we will return to it shortly.
V.B.  Government Purchases under Flexible Prices
As a benchmark, recall the condition on fiscal policy in the flexible-price 
allocation (equation 23):
′( ) = ′( ) u C v G t t t for all .
The most important implication of this relationship is that public and private 
consumption move together. Intuitively, if a shock induces households to 
save more and spend less, it raises the marginal utility of consumption. 
The optimal response of fiscal policy under flexible prices is to follow the 
private sector’s lead by lowering government expenditure. As a result of 
the decline in G1, consumption falls less in all periods than it would have if 
fiscal policy were to remain fixed at its preshock levels.
For future reference, the optimal level of government spending under 
flexible prices is
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Under our maintained assumption that s < 1, optimal government spending 
falls in response to the negative shock to future technology A2.
V.C.  Government Purchases under Short-Run Sticky Prices
We now return to a setting with sticky prices. As was shown in equations 
31 and 32, if the economy is operating below full employment, the equilib-
rium levels of consumption do not depend on the choice of G1. That is, as 
long as some productive resources are idle, an increase in public consump-
tion has an opportunity cost of zero. Therefore, as long as the marginal 
utility of government services is positive, the government should increase 
spending until the economy reaches full employment.
The government spending multiplier here is precisely 1. This result is 
akin to the balanced-budget multiplier in the traditional Keynesian income-
expenditure model. Here, as in that model, an increase in government n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  233
spending puts idle resources to work and raises income. Consumers, mean-
while, see their income rise but recognize that their taxes will rise by the 
same amount to finance that new, higher level of government spending. As 
a result, consumption and investment are unchanged, and the increase in 
income precisely equals the increase in government spending.5
Formally, one can show that the following first-order conditions charac-
terize the government’s optimum:6
′( ) = ′( ) v G A v G 1 2 2 β
′( ) ′( ) u C v G t t t > for all .
Because government spending puts idle resources to use, optimal spend-
ing on public consumption rises above the point that equates its marginal 
utility to that of private consumption.7 The optimal level of government 
spending in the first period is
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One can show that optimal government spending exceeds the level that 
would be set at the flexible-price equilibrium. That is, G1
sticky > G1
flex. Whether 
the optimal G1
sticky is a stimulus relative to preshock G1 is a bit more compli-
cated. For a shock that just barely pushes into the zero-lower-bound region 
(that is, A2 equal to or slightly worse than the threshold in equation 48), the 
5.  Woodford (2011) discusses how New Keynesian models tend to produce government 
spending multipliers that equal unity if the real interest rate is held constant. In a later section, 
we present an extension of our model that yields a multiplier greater than 1.
6.  Readers interested in a more explicit (if laborious) demonstration of these and other 
results should consult the online appendix.
7.  One surprising implication is that government consumption in the second period 
also expands beyond the classical benchmark. The reason is that, according to equation 33, 
increased second-period government consumption stimulates first-period investment. Why? 
Intuitively, higher g2 tends to reduce second-period consumption for a given output, which in 
turn tends to increase the second-period price level (recall that M2 = P2C2). Higher expected 
inflation would tend to reduce the real interest rate, stimulating investment. In the final 
equilibrium, however, investment and potential output expand sufficiently to leave C2 and 
P2 unaffected.234  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
optimal G1
sticky falls below preshock G1, indicating the optimality of fiscal 
contraction. In this case the central bank has the capacity to offset most of 
the shock with conventional monetary easing, and government spending 
can fall below its preshock level toward its new, lower, flexible-price level. 
For larger shocks, however, optimal G1
sticky will be greater than preshock G1, 
indicating the optimality of fiscal expansion. In this case there is a lot of 
idle capacity for fiscal policy to use up.
One can derive a full set of equations comparing the equilibrium with 
optimal fiscal policy as described here with the flexible-price equilibrium. 
They establish that
C C 1 1
sticky flex <
C C 2 2
sticky flex <
I I 1 1
sticky flex =
G G 1 1
sticky flex >
G G 2 2
sticky flex >
Y Y 1 1
sticky flex =
Y Y 2 2
sticky flex = .
The bottom line is that when monetary policy fails to achieve full employ-
ment, it is optimal for the government to put the economy’s idle resources 
to work by increasing its spending. This fiscal policy is second-best, how-
ever, because it fails to produce the same allocation of resources achieved 
under flexible prices. Public consumption will be higher in both periods, 
but private consumption will be lower. As a result, households will end up 
with a lower level of welfare.
V.D.  Investment Subsidy
Next we expand the government’s fiscal tool kit by allowing it to subsidize 
investment by choosing s > 0. Like government purchases, the investment 
subsidy can cause idle capital to be brought into production. When output 
is below its full-employment level in the first period, a positive investment 
subsidy is welfare improving. That is true whether government spending n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  235
is unchanged or is set to its new flexible-price optimum. (See the online 
appendix for details.) In general, the subsidy that generates full employment 
is a complicated function of the economy’s parameters.
One special case, however, clarifies the intuition for the role of the 
investment subsidy. In much traditional Keynesian analysis, the real inter-
est rate does not much affect private consumption. One might interpret this 
as suggesting that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is very small. 
If we take the limit as s → 0, then the optimal investment subsidy is
( ) , 54 1 s i = −
where i1 is the interest rate chosen in equation 50 that reproduces the 
flexible-price equilibrium. Government spending in this equilibrium is once 
again set on classical principles. Equation 54 shows that the government 
sets the investment subsidy rate equal to the opposite of the optimal nega-
tive nominal interest rate. Intuitively, the investment subsidy allows the 
government to provide the same incentives for investment as the negative 
interest rate would have, if the latter were possible, thereby reproducing 
the flexible-price equilibrium.8
For the more general case of positive s, we rely on numerical simula-
tions to judge the welfare consequences of policy change. We offer such 
calculations in the next subsection.
V.E.  Comparing Welfare Gains with Output Gains from Fiscal Tools
It is common for policy debates to focus on the output stimulus achiev-
able by various policy options. Using our results above, we now turn to a 
numerical evaluation of whether this focus on “bang for the buck” is a good 
guide to policymaking. As an alternative, we also calculate a welfare-based 
measure of policy effectiveness.
Suppose the economy begins at full employment and the zero lower 
bound. If it is then hit by a negative shock to A2, conventional monetary 
policy is ineffective, and we assume that future monetary expansion is 
impossible. We want to compare several alternative fiscal policies, all 
aimed at achieving full employment:
—an increase in current government spending G1, holding future gov-
ernment spending G2 constant
8.  The use of tax instruments as a substitute for monetary policy is also examined in 
recent work by Correia and others (2010).236  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
—an increase in both current and future government spending, main-
taining the government’s intertemporal Euler equation
—an investment subsidy, holding government spending constant
—an investment subsidy, allowing government spending to optimally 
adjust.
These four policies are all compared with a benchmark in which fiscal 
policy is held fixed at its preshock level. For each policy we calculate a 
version of what is usually called the multiplier, or “bang for the buck.” 
This statistic is the increase in current output (Y1) divided by the increase in 
the current government budget deficit.9 We also calculate a welfare-based 
measure of the returns to each fiscal policy option. In particular, we calculate 
the percent increase in current consumption (C1) in the benchmark economy 
that would raise welfare in the benchmark economy to that under the indi-
cated fiscal policy option.
Table 1 shows the results of these calculations for a variety of parameter 
values. Three parameters are important to the model. First, our baseline 
value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is s = 0.5, well within 
standard ranges for macroeconomic models, and we consider both higher 
and lower values for s. Second, our baseline value for the household’s 
relative taste for government consumption is q = 0.24. As we showed above, 
q equals the ratio G/C at the flexible-price equilibrium, and this ratio is 
0.24 in the U.S. national income accounts for 2009. We consider higher 
and lower values for q as well. Finally, our baseline value for the size of 
the shock to future technology is 25 percent, but we also consider shocks 
of 10 percent and 40 percent.
The results in table 1 suggest that the conventional emphasis on the output 
multiplier may be substantially misleading as a guide to optimal policy. In 
none of the variants considered does the policy with the largest multiplier 
also generate the greatest welfare gain.
One pattern is particularly striking: across all parameter values that 
we consider, the policy that is best for welfare (the fourth policy option in 
the table) is the worst according to the bang-for-the-buck metric. The rea-
son is that this policy recommends a large investment subsidy in the first 
period, generating a deficit nearly twice as large as the next-largest deficit 
among the other three policies. Although it generates much less bang for 
9.  The increase in the deficit is calculated as the increase in G1 plus any loss in revenue 
from the investment subsidy s. Implicitly, this holds current lump-sum tax revenue T1 fixed. 
Recall that the timing of tax payments is irrelevant to the equilibrium of the model economy 
because all households are forward looking.T
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the buck, this investment subsidy allows policymakers to stabilize output 
with lower public consumption. This raises private consumption in both the 
first and the second periods, relative to the other policy options, and moves 
the economy closer to the flexible-price equilibrium. The final column of 
table 1 shows that this policy generates nearly as large a welfare gain as 
would fully flexible monetary policy.
VI.    Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Model  
with Three Periods
In this section we add a third period to the baseline model. As the main 
features of the model are unchanged, our purpose in adding a third period is 
specific: to expand the set of tools available to the central bank. The Federal 
Reserve has recently pursued policies aimed at lowering long-term nominal 
interest rates. Adding a third period to the model allows us to clarify the 
role of such a policy in stabilizing aggregate demand.
Three periods imply two nominal interest rates, which we denote i1 and i2. 
The latter is a future short-term interest rate; hence, by standard term-
structure relationships, a change in i2 will move long-term rates in the first 
period in the same direction. The long-term money supply is now denoted M3. 
We focus on the case when the price level in the first period is fixed; prices 
are flexible in the second and third periods. To keep things simple, we omit 
all fiscal policy in this section (that is, q = 0 for all t, so Gt = 0 as well).
The expression for equilibrium output when output is demand constrained 
is the following:
Y
A
A
A A
A A 1
3
3 2
2 3
2 3 1
1 1
= +

 

  +

 

 





 β β
σ σ
 
 + ( ) + ( )
M
P i i
3
1 1 2 1 1
.
This expression shows the monetary policy tools that can offset a shock to 
aggregate demand. If s < 1, a fall in future productivity (A2 or A3) reduces 
output for a given monetary policy. The central bank has three tools to 
offset such a shock. It can lower the current short-term interest rate i1, it can 
reduce long-term interest rates by reducing the future short-term rate i2, or 
it can raise the long-term nominal anchor M3.
Two conclusions about the efficacy of monetary policy are apparent. First, 
if the long-term nominal anchor M3 is held fixed, the ability to influence 
long-term interest rates expands the central bank’s scope for restoring the 
optimal allocation of resources. Formally, one can derive thresholds for n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  239
A2 above which conventional and unconventional policies are sufficient to 
restore the flexible-price equilibrium. One can show that
A A 2 2 long-term interest conventional < .
Second, as before, if the central bank can control the long-term nominal 
anchor M3, there is no limit to its ability to restore the flexible-price 
equilibrium.
VII.  Government Investment
So far, all government spending in this model has been for public consump-
tion. We now consider one way in which public investment spending might 
be incorporated into the model. We return to our baseline model with two 
periods, with one addition. In addition to private investment, we also have 
investment by the government, denoted GI. Government consumption is 
now denoted GC.
The production function is
Y A K A K t t
F
t
F
t
G
t
G ≤ + ( ) κ ,
where Kt
F and Kt
G are the private and public capital stocks, and At
F and At
G 
are exogenous technology parameters specific to private (firm) and public 
(government) capital. The function k(z) reflects the idea that the two forms 
of capital are not perfect substitutes in production. To ensure a sensible 
interior solution, we assume k′(z) > 0 and k″(z) < 0.
Under flexible prices, the solution to the government’s optimal policy 
problem satisfies the following conditions:
′( ) = ′( ) u C v G
C
1 1
′( ) = ′( ) u C v G
C
2 2
( ) 55 1 2 2 ′( ) = ′( ) v G A v G
C F C β
( ) . 56 2
2
2
′( ) = κ K
A
A
G
F
G
The first three of these should be familiar by now, as they are the same clas-
sical conditions as in the baseline model. The last is a new condition showing 240  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
that optimal fiscal policy sets the marginal product of public capital equal 
to that of private capital. It implies that the optimal amount of public capital 
depends on the relative productivities of private and public capital. For exam-
ple, a fall in the productivity of private capital (A2
F), holding the productivity 
of public capital (A2
G) constant, increases optimal investment in public capital.
If prices are sticky, the following equations describe the economy’s 
equilibrium:
C
A
A
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i P
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2
2
1 1
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.
These are close analogues to equations 31 through 34, modified to include 
government investment. If monetary policy is unrestricted, the central bank 
can use this solution to derive optimal policy and achieve the first-best 
flexible-price equilibrium. We focus on the case, however, in which monetary 
policy is limited, in order to examine the possible role of fiscal policy.
Optimal fiscal policy changes surprisingly little with the introduction 
of government investment. In particular, it remains true, as in our previous 
analysis under sticky prices, that
′( ) > ′( ) u C v G
C
1 1n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  241
′( ) > ′( ) u C v G
C
2 2 ,
that is, the government increases public consumption beyond the point that 
a classical criterion would indicate. However, the conditions specified in 
equations 55 and 56 continue to hold. Investment in public capital is still 
determined by equating the marginal products of the two types of capital.
One might ask, Why doesn’t public investment rise even further to help 
soak up some of the idle capacity? It turns out that, in this model, public 
investment crowds out private investment. In particular, private investment 
at the zero lower bound is determined by
I
g
M
P
A
A
G
C
G
F
I
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
=
− ( )
− ( ) κ .
At the optimum, as determined by equation 56, ∂I1/∂G I
1 = -1. The intuition 
behind this result is the following. When the government increases public 
investment, other things equal, it tends to increase second-period output 
and consumption. An increase in second-period consumption for a given 
money supply tends to push down second-period prices, raising the first-
period real interest rate. Private investment falls, leaving the effective capi- 
tal stock, K
A
A
K
F
G
F
G
2
2
2
2 + ( ) κ , unchanged. As a result, public investment is an 
ineffective stabilization tool and therefore continues to be set on classical 
principles.
10
As with the baseline model, an investment subsidy can implement the 
flexible-price optimum in this model in the limit as s → 0. The optimal 
subsidy matches the size of the negative nominal interest rate that would 
implement the flexible-price equilibrium if negative rates were possible, as 
in equation 54.
VIII.  Tax Policy in a Non-Ricardian Setting
Throughout the analysis so far, households have been assumed to be forward-
looking utility maximizers, and thus their behavior accords with Ricardian 
equivalence. Changes in tax policy have important effects in the model if 
10.  The mechanism here resembles Eggertsson’s (2010) “paradox of toil,” according to 
which positive supply-side incentives reduce expected inflation, raise real interest rates, and 
depress aggregate demand and short-run output.242  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
they influence incentives (as in the case of investment subsidies), but not to 
the extent that they merely alter the timing of tax liabilities.
Many economists, however, are skeptical about Ricardian equivalence. 
Moreover, much evidence suggests that consumption tracks current income 
more closely than can be explained by the standard model of inter  temporal 
optimization (see, for example, Campbell and Mankiw 1989). In this section   
we build non-Ricardian behavior into our model by assuming that house-
holds choose consumption in the first period in part as maximizers and in 
part as followers of a simple rule of thumb. Such behavior can cause the 
timing of taxes to affect the economy’s equilibrium through consump-
tion demand, and it opens new possibilities for optimal fiscal policy.
Formally, a share (1 - l) of each household’s consumption in a given 
period is determined by what a maximizing household above would choose, 
while a share l is set equal to a fraction r of current disposable income. 
We denote these two components of consumption Ct
M for the maximizing 
share and Ct
R for the rule-of-thumb share, where
C Y T t
R
t t = − ( ) ρ ,
and a household’s total consumption is
C C C t t
M
t
R = − ( ) + 1 λ λ .
We choose a value for r that sets Ct
M = Ct
R before any shocks. That is, the 
proportionality coefficient in the rule of thumb is assumed to have adjusted 
so that the level of consumption was initially optimal. But in response to 
a shock, households will continue to follow this rule of thumb, potentially 
causing consumption to deviate from the utility-maximizing level.
Adding rule-of-thumb behavior has minor implications for the conditions 
determining equilibrium. The one equation directly affected by it is the 
household’s intertemporal Euler condition, where now only the maximiz-
ing component of consumption satisfies this condition. As in the analysis of 
the Ricardian baseline model, we characterize optimal monetary and fiscal 
policy in a variety of settings after the economy has suffered an unexpected 
shock to future technology A2. We assume that the budget was balanced 
(G1 = T1) before the shock.
The first result to note is that optimal fiscal policy is the same in the 
flexible-price scenario and in the fixed-price scenario with fully effective 
monetary policy. In both cases output remains at the full-employment n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  243
level. This is similar to what we have seen previously. However, in this 
non-Ricardian model, the optimal timing of optimal tax policy responds 
to the shock to A2. To the extent that households follow the rule of thumb 
for consumption, they fail to reduce their first-period consumption appro-
priately in response to their lower wealth. To set first-period consumption 
equal to its optimal value, the government should raise taxes T1.
Formally, the optimal fiscal policy is described by these equations:
T
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2
2
2
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2 1 1
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The optimal budget balance would be
T G
A
A
AK 1 1
2
2
2 1 1
1
1
1
− =
+

 

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




 β
σ .
In words, a decline in the economy’s wealth due to a reduction in future 
productivity should induce a budget surplus. Just as the forward-looking 
consumers start saving more in response to new circumstances, the govern-
ment also tightens its own belt by reducing spending to its flexible-price 
equilibrium level and setting taxes above that level, thereby increasing 
public saving as well.
Now consider the case in which prices are sticky and monetary policy 
is restricted to a conventional one of reducing the short-term interest rate. 
If the shock to aggregate demand is sufficiently large, this monetary policy 
may be insufficient to restore the economy to full employment and the opti-
mal allocation of resources. In this case fiscal policy may play a valuable 
role in increasing aggregate demand.244  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
The reduced-form solution for output as a function of policy is the 
following:
Y G T
A
A
A
1 1 1
2
2
2
1
1 1
1
1
1
=
−
−
−
+
−

 

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− λρ
λρ
λρ
λρ
β
λρ
σ
( ( )
+
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− ( )
+
+ − ( )
G
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2
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.
Notice that if l > 0, the timing of taxes influences equilibrium output. 
Moreover, the government purchases multiplier now exceeds unity. What 
is particularly noteworthy is that the government spending and tax multi-
pliers in this model (the coefficients on the first two terms) resemble those 
in the traditional Keynesian income-expenditure model, where lr takes the 
place of the marginal propensity to consume. However, it is not possible to 
vary G1 or T1 without also changing some other fiscal variable to satisfy the 
government budget constraint.
One can show that optimal fiscal policy in this setting satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
′( ) = ′( ) u C v G 1 1
′( ) = ′( ) v G A v G 1 2 2 β .
These conditions are two of the same classical principles that characterize 
fiscal policy in the baseline flexible-price equilibrium. There is, however, 
an important exception: the intertemporal Euler equation for private con-
sumption is no longer included in the conditions for the optimum. The rea-
son is that when the economy has idle resources, the real interest rate fails to 
appropriately reflect the price of current relative to future consumption. Thus, 
optimal policy in this non-Ricardian setting induces households to consume 
more than they would on their own if they were intertemporally maximizing.
To get a better sense for these results, it is useful to compare the optimal 
allocation in this non-Ricardian sticky-price model with that in the cor-
responding Ricardian sticky-price model examined earlier. We denote 
the current section’s model with the superscript “nonR.” One can show the 
following:n. gregory mankiw and matthew weinzierl  245
C C 1 1
nonR sticky >
C C 2 2
nonR sticky =
I I 1 1
nonR sticky <
G G 1 1
nonR sticky <
G G 2 2
nonR sticky <
Y Y 1 1
nonR sticky =
Y Y 2 2
nonR sticky < .
These inequalities show that optimal fiscal policy in this non-Ricardian 
model can move the equilibrium allocations of consumption and govern-
ment purchases closer to the baseline flexible-price optimum. In particular, 
because the government here can use taxes to stimulate consumption demand, 
it relies less on increases in government purchases.
If we reintroduce the investment subsidy into the model, the results 
change even more dramatically. In particular, fiscal policymakers now have 
sufficient tools to fully restore the flexible-price equilibrium. The online 
appendix shows the proof, but the intuition is straightforward. Because 
fiscal policy can influence consumption through the lump-sum tax, invest-
ment through the investment subsidy, and government purchases directly,   
it has complete control over the allocation of resources. When A2 falls, 
optimal policy in the first period calls for a decrease in government spending 
(because society is poorer), an increase in taxes (so that the non-Ricardian 
component of consumption responds appropriately to the lower permanent 
income), and an investment subsidy (to stimulate investment spending and 
aggregate demand). Thus, sufficiently flexible fiscal policy can yield the 
first-best outcome even when monetary policy cannot.
IX.  Some Tentative Policy Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been to explore optimal monetary and fiscal 
policy for an economy experiencing a shortfall in aggregate demand. The 
model we have used is in many ways conventional. It includes short-run 
sticky prices, long-run flexible prices, and intertemporal optimization and 246  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
forward-looking behavior on the part of firms and households. It is simple 
enough to be tractable yet rich enough to offer some useful guidelines for 
policymakers. These guidelines are tentative because, after all, our model 
is only a model. Yet with this caveat in mind, it will be useful to state the 
model’s conclusions as clearly and starkly as possible.
One unambiguous implication of the analysis is that whether and how 
any policy instrument is used depends on which other instruments are 
available. To summarize the results, it is fair to say that there is a hierarchy 
of instruments for policymakers to take off the shelf when the economy has 
insufficient aggregate demand to maintain full employment of its productive 
resources.
The first level of the hierarchy applies when the zero lower bound on the 
short-term interest rate is not binding. In this case, conventional monetary 
policy is sufficient to restore the economy to full employment. That is, all 
that is needed is for the central bank to cut the short-term interest rate. Fiscal 
policy should be set based on classical principles of cost-benefit analy-
sis, rather than Keynesian principles of demand management. Government 
consumption should be set to equate its marginal utility with the marginal 
utility of private consumption. Government investment should be set to equate 
its marginal product with the marginal product of private investment.
The second level of the hierarchy applies when the short-term interest 
rate hits against the zero lower bound. In this case, unconventional mon-
etary policy becomes the next policy instrument to be used to restore full 
employment. A reduction in long-term interest rates may be sufficient when 
a cut in the short-term interest rate is not. And an increase in the long-term 
nominal anchor is, in this model, always sufficient to put the economy back 
on track. This policy might be interpreted, for example, as the central bank 
targeting a higher level of nominal GDP growth. With this monetary policy 
in place, fiscal policy remains classically determined.
The third level of the hierarchy is reached when monetary policy is 
severely constrained. In particular, the short-term interest rate has hit the 
zero bound, and the central bank is unable to commit to future monetary 
policy actions. In this case, fiscal policy may play a role. The model, how-
ever, does not point toward conventional fiscal policy, such as cuts in taxes 
and increases in government spending, to prop up aggregate demand. Rather, 
fiscal policy should aim at incentivizing interest-sensitive components of 
spending, such as investment. In essence, optimal fiscal policy tries to do 
what monetary policy would if it could.
The fourth and final level of the hierarchy is reached when monetary 
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limited set of fiscal tools. If targeted tax policy is for some reason unavail-
able, then policymakers may want to expand aggregate demand by increas-
ing government spending, as well as cutting the overall level of taxation to 
encourage consumption. In a sense, conventional fiscal policy is the demand 
management tool of last resort.
X.  A Methodological Epilogue
Economists rely on simple models to develop and hone their intuition about 
how the economy works. When considering the role of fiscal policy for 
dealing with an economy in recession, the first thought of many economists 
is the famous income-expenditure model, also known as the “Keynesian 
cross,” which they learned as undergraduates. With a minimum of algebra 
and geometry, the model shows how fiscal policy can increase aggregate 
demand and thereby close the gap between output and its potential. Indeed, 
some of the more sophisticated econometric models used for macroeconomic 
policy analysis are founded on the logic of this simple model.
The conventional application of these macroeconomic models for nor-
mative purposes, however, is hard to reconcile with more basic economic 
principles. Ultimately, all policy should aim to improve some measure of 
welfare, such as the utility of the typical individual in society. The output 
gap matters not in itself but rather because it must in some way be an input 
into welfare.
An often-cited aphorism of James Tobin’s (1977, p. 468) is that “it takes 
a heap of Harberger Triangles to fill an Okun Gap.”11 The saying is invoked 
to suggest that when the economy is suffering from the effects of recession, 
microeconomic inefficiencies should become a lower priority than bringing 
the economy back to potential. This conclusion, however, may be too glib. 
Policymakers have various tools at their disposal with which they can influ-
ence aggregate demand. Which tools they use to bring the economy back 
to full employment can profoundly influence the level of welfare achieved. 
That is, welfare is a function of both Okun’s gaps and Harberger trian-
gles, and policymakers need to be mindful of this fact when they conduct 
demand management.
11.  For economists under the age of 40, who may be less familiar with these archaic 
terms: a Harberger triangle is the area in a supply-and-demand diagram that measures the 
deadweight loss of a tax or other market distortion. An Okun’s gap is the loss in output and 
employment that occurs when the economy falls below potential because of insufficient 
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The policy guidelines we have derived in this paper are based on the 
standard tools of welfare economics. Much debate over fiscal policy com-
pares the policy alternatives using metrics that are quite different from 
a welfare measure. In particular, the commonly used fiscal multiplier, or 
“bang for the buck,” which measures how much GDP rises for each dollar 
added to the budget deficit, is a potentially misleading guide to evaluating 
alternative policies. The reason is that welfare depends not only on the level 
of output, but also on its composition among the various components of 
spending. In other words, policymakers should aim to close the Okun’s gap 
not at the smallest budgetary cost but, instead, while creating the smallest 
Harberger triangles.
Finally, we remind the reader that our specific policy conclusions are 
based on a particularly simple model. We have chosen this approach because 
simple models can clarify thinking more powerfully than complex ones. 
Our model includes those elements that we believe are most crucial for the 
topic at hand. But there is no doubt that many features of the real economy 
have been left out. To be specific: We have not included financial frictions or 
problems of financial intermediation. We have not incorporated any open-
economy features. We have lump-sum rather than distortionary taxes. We 
assume no uncertainty. We incorporate sticky prices, but we do not take 
into account that firms’ price setting is staggered or that different sectors 
may have different degrees of price rigidity. We have not formally modeled 
the political process that allows some policy tools to be used more easily 
than others. Future work may well modify our framework and, in doing so, 
call some of our tentative conclusions into question. We hope that the sim-
ple and transparent model presented here provides a useful starting point 
for those future investigations.
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Comments and Discussion
Comment By
oLIVIeR BLAnCHARD    The recent crisis has made clear that it is time 
to revisit the role of fiscal policy as a potential macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion tool. In this context I like the intent of this paper by Gregory Mankiw 
and Matthew Weinzierl. I also like their approach and their model. One 
can learn a lot from simple, two-period models when they are intelligently 
conceived, and I have indeed learned a lot from this one.
Before I discuss their paper, however, let me accuse the authors of a 
crime of omission. They should have referred to Paul Samuelson’s 1951 
paper, “Principles and Rules in Modern Fiscal Policy: A Neo-Classical 
Reformulation.” Aside from the contrast between Samuelson’s inimitable 
style and the present paper’s use of equations, the two papers are eerily 
parallel in their approach, starting from first principles but doing so in a 
Keynesian environment. The two papers differ in their conclusions, the 
source of this difference being Samuelson’s skepticism about monetary   
policy, which leaves a large role for fiscal policy, versus Mankiw and 
Weinzierl’s optimism about monetary policy, which correspondingly reduces 
the role of fiscal policy.
Indeed, I see Mankiw and Weinzierl’s main contribution as the proposi-
tion that monetary policy is such a powerful weapon that there is little need 
for fiscal policy. The paper raises a number of other questions, for example 
whether there are magic bullets against the liquidity trap. But I shall leave 
those aside and focus on the “preeminence of monetary policy” proposi-
tion. In their model the case is indeed a strong one. As they themselves say, 
the question is then of how special their model is.
Let me begin by defining three alternative output concepts. The first is 
the actual level of output; the second the natural level of output, defined 
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rigidities; the third is the optimal, or “welfare relevant,” level of output, 
defined as that which would be achieved were there no distortions. (These 
definitions raise many issues and would have to be made more precise in 
any particular model. But they will do for my purposes.) Given those defi-
nitions, let me now restate Mankiw and Weinzierl’s central proposition: if 
monetary policy can be used to attain both the natural level of output and 
its composition, and if the shocks to which policy is responding do not 
affect the gap between the natural and the optimal level of output, then 
there is no role for countercyclical fiscal policy.
In the authors’ benchmark model (and in the standard New Keynesian 
framework, where the only distortions are monopolistic competition and 
Calvo pricing), the above two conditions are met. In response to a decline 
in animal spirits, maintaining output at the natural level requires a change 
in the interest rate, and this is what monetary policy is about. And in their 
model the natural and the optimal level of output are the same, so that 
maintaining output at the natural level is the right thing to do.
Beyond the benchmark, however, how likely are these two conditions to 
be met? What I shall do here is consider a few cases in which one or both 
conditions fail and then discuss whether this gives a role to fiscal policy. 
My assertions should be taken as highly speculative; this is the privilege of 
being a discussant rather than an author.
Consider the first condition. When can monetary policy be used to rep-
licate the natural level of output as well as its composition? Mankiw and 
Weinzierl consider one case in which it cannot, namely, when interest rates 
hit the zero bound and the central bank cannot commit to future policy. 
But one can think of many other cases in which monetary policy cannot 
fully undo the effects of a shock. Consider, for example, a financial shock 
in which half of the financial intermediation system fails. Then monetary 
policy clearly cannot be used to eliminate the effects. If it aims for the 
natural level of output, it will have to achieve it by having very high output 
in the sector that still has access to financial intermediation, to compensate 
for its impotence in the sector that does not. Does this introduce a role 
for fiscal policy? Across-the-board increases in spending or, if Ricardian 
equivalence fails, across-the-board decreases in taxes, can help but cannot 
fully solve the problem, as they are likely to affect both sectors equally. 
There is, however, no reason to limit fiscal policy in this way. The right 
policy, as in some of the authors’ examples, is targeted subsidies aimed at 
the ailing sector.
Now consider the second condition. What about shocks that affect the 
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an increase in the price of oil in the presence of real wage rigidities.
1 In this 
case the natural level of output falls: in the presence of real wage rigidities, 
the decrease in the real wage implied by the increase in the price of oil leads 
to a decrease in the natural level of employment, and thus a decrease in the 
natural level of output. The optimal level of output may either decrease or 
remain constant, depending on the specifics of preferences and technology. 
If it decreases, it decreases by less than the natural level. Monetary policy 
can replicate the natural level of output. But this is typically not optimal, 
as the natural level may now be far below the optimal level. Optimal mon-
etary policy in this case aims at achieving a level of output higher than the 
natural level, but it does so at the cost of higher inflation. Does this give 
a role to fiscal policy? Again, across-the-board increases in spending, or 
decreases in taxes, are unlikely to be very useful. Like monetary policy, 
they will increase output, but at the cost of higher inflation as well. How-
ever, just as in the previous example, targeted subsidies or cuts in taxes, 
aimed at reducing the decrease in the (after-tax) real wage, can potentially 
improve the outcome.
Admittedly, in the two examples I have outlined, fiscal policy has it too 
easy. With a sufficiently large set of instruments, it can aim at the underly-
ing distortions and, at least in principle, offset them. But neither example 
offers a strong case for general increases in spending or decreases in taxes. 
Can one think of more convincing examples?
A standard textbook argument for the use of both monetary and fiscal 
policy is that, combined in the right way, they can achieve both internal and 
external balance, returning both output and the current account balance to 
their natural level. For example, if output is below its natural level and the 
current account shows a large surplus, the right combination of expansion-
ary monetary and fiscal policy can increase output and reduce the surplus. 
Does this textbook argument survive Mankiw and Weinzierl’s derivation 
from first principles? This is less obvious than it might seem. Take, for 
example, a shock that, as in the paper, takes the form of a decrease in 
expected future income, which leads to a decrease in output and, as imports 
decrease, a current account surplus. In this case, just as in the authors’ 
benchmark model, monetary policy can do the job alone: a decrease in 
the interest rate can return output to its natural level; as it does, so will 
imports, and so will the current account balance. There is no need for fiscal 
policy. What this suggests is the need, if the textbook argument is to hold, 
1.  I use this example mainly because I am familiar with it from my work with Jordi Galí 
(Blanchard and Galí 2007).COMMENTS and DISCUSSION  253
to invoke more complex shocks, for example, one that leads to both an 
overall decrease in spending and an inefficient shift in demand away from 
domestic goods (that is, one not based on a shift in preferences). Then mon-
etary policy can address the overall decrease in spending, and government 
spending on domestic goods can address the inefficiency problem. Can one 
think of convincing examples of such shocks? I could not, but this may be 
for lack of imagination on my part.
Yet another frequently heard argument for the joint use of monetary 
and fiscal policy is the presence of instrument uncertainty: neither type of 
policy is a sure thing, so better to use both. This argument is surely correct. 
Under multiplicative uncertainty, however, it will still be the case that, for 
the reasons the authors give, monetary policy is the policy of choice. But 
the greater the uncertainty about the effect of monetary policy, and the 
smaller the uncertainty about the effect of fiscal policy, the greater the role 
for fiscal policy. The argument may also hold even under additive uncer-
tainty, if the loss function is asymmetric or if the responses of the economy 
to policy are nonlinear. This was clearly central in the thinking of policy-
makers in 2008 and 2009: to avoid what they perceived as a potentially 
catastrophic collapse of output, they decided to deploy all the weapons they 
had, not only using both monetary and fiscal policy but, within monetary 
policy, using many tools in conjunction.
Where does all this leave me? In thinking through the examples, I was 
surprised that I could not make a stronger case for fiscal policy, and so 
my posterior on the Mankiw-Weinzierl proposition is stronger than my 
prior. I would state my posterior this way: when, as I think is indeed the 
case, the main shocks behind economic fluctuations are shocks to animal 
spirits (whether or not they come from changes in expected productivity, 
or out of nowhere), then indeed monetary policy can go a long way toward 
offsetting the shock, and there may not be much use for conventional fis-
cal policy. With respect to other shocks, monetary policy will typically not 
work as well. But broad fiscal policy measures, be they across-the-board 
changes in spending or in taxes, may not do much better. Fiscal policy may 
have a role, but typically through more narrowly targeted measures.
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Comment By
GAUtI B. eGGeRtSSon    I like this paper by Gregory Mankiw and 
Matthew Weinzierl, and not only for presenting a simple and elegant model 
that is easy to follow. I also like the topic, which is optimal stabilization 
policy—in the classic “aggregate demand management” sense—using both 
monetary and fiscal policy instruments, with special consideration of what 
happens once the short-term nominal interest rate has fallen to zero. This is 
certainly a topic close to my heart: the very first paper I wrote in my career as 
an economist (Eggertsson 2001) was on this topic and relates quite closely 
to some of the results presented here.1 That paper was written within what 
has now become known as the standard New Keynesian framework. Here I 
will contrast the results from that unpublished paper with those of this paper. 
Although this may seem a somewhat self-indulgent distraction, I hope to   
show that this exercise provides some additional insights, not only by under-
lining the generality of the current paper’s results, which I think extend 
much beyond the two-period model the authors propose, but also by high-
lighting some important limitations.
Although the authors touch on many issues, I will focus on their sug-
gested four lines of defense against large shocks, which I summarize below. 
To anticipate my conclusions: broadly speaking, I agree with the authors’ 
characterization. What I will show is that the principles they lay out also 
generalize naturally to a standard New Keynesian framework, building on 
the earlier work cited above. In the process I want to emphasize various 
nuances that may appear a little less obvious in the authors’ two-period 
model. What I take from these nuances is this: stabilization policy can 
be very difficult when the shock is large enough to lower the short-term 
interest rate to zero. In fact, my sense is that all four lines of defense 
have been penetrated in recent years in the United States, at the very 
least in the sense that the economy now looks far from its first-best state 
despite some recovery measures. My takeaway is that a better under-
standing is needed of both the political and the economic constraints 
imposed on stabilization policy.
To summarize the paper: Mankiw and Weinzierl articulate four lines of   
defense available to a policymaker in response to a shock to demand, and they 
arrange these in what they call a hierarchy of policy alternatives. The first   
line of defense is cutting the short-term nominal interest rate. The fact that 
the short-term nominal interest rate cannot be negative brings the authors 
1.  Somewhat embarrassingly, I never got around to submitting that paper anywhere, so 
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to the second line of defense, which is to cut long-term interest rates. If this 
path, too, is infeasible, then the authors suggest, as the third line of defense, 
variations in taxes to increase private spending. Finally, if all else fails, the 
authors propose government spending as a stimulus of last resort.
Mankiw and Weinzierl sketch out the basic battle plan within the con-
text of a two-period model with perfect competition but where prices have 
been exogenously fixed in the first period. Before discussing the four lines 
of defense, I shall outline a simple alternative environment, where I want 
to put the results in context.
Consider an economy in which households live over an infinite horizon 
instead of only two periods. Assume that firms in this economy employ 
the members of these households and produce differentiated goods, which 
are then sold to the households. Finally, as the main twist in this envi-
ronment, assume that prices are set at staggered intervals and that firms 
satisfy whatever demand prevails at these prices, thus bringing monetary 
nonneutrality into the model. Whereas Mankiw and Weinzierl assume rigid 
prices in the first period and fully flexible prices in the second, I follow here 
the more recent New Keynesian tradition in assuming, as does Guillermo 
Calvo (1983), that each firm sets a price for its output that is fixed for a 
stochastic number of periods. I will not go into the details of the model 
here (see, for example, Eggertsson 2001) but instead summarize the model 
in its linearized-quadratic form.
Let pt denote inflation, ˆ Yt the deviation of output as a fraction of its 
steady state, ˆ Gt the deviation of government spending from its steady state 
as a fraction of steady-state output, it the logarithm of 1 plus the short-term 
nominal interest rate, Et an expectations operator, and re
t an exogenous dis-
turbance term. The model can be summarized by the following two linear 
equations (the first from the household’s optimal consumption decision and 
the second from the firm’s pricing decision) and the zero bound on the 
short-term nominal interest rate:
( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 1 Y Y i r G G t t t t t t t
e
t t t = − − − ( ) + − + + + E E E σ π
( ) ˆ ˆ 2 1 π κ δκ β π t t t t t Y G = − + + E
( ) , 3 0 i ≥
where the coefficients b and d are between 0 and 1 and the coefficients k 
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Although I will not go into the details of the underlying microfounda-
tions, I do want to highlight the underlying utility function of the repre-
sentative household, and especially a second-order approximation of it. 
This will be helpful for understanding the results and deriving optimal 
policy. The household’s utility is
Et
t
t
t
t t t u C w G v h i di β ψ
=
∞
∑ ∫ ( ) − ( ) − ( ) ( )

 

 
0 0
1
,
where Ct is private consumption (a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of differenti-
ated goods), Gt is public consumption, ht(i) is hours worked, b is a discount 
factor, and yt is a shock that leads to variations in r e
t (all functions satisfy 
standard properties). Eggertsson (2001) shows that a second-order expan-
sion of this utility function gives2
( ) ˆ ˆ , 4
0
2 2 2 − + +    
=
∞
∑ Et
t
t
t y t G t Y G β π λ λ
where the coefficients ly and lG are greater than zero. Without further ado, 
let me now move to the first line of defense in the presence of a large 
adverse shock.
ThE  fIRST  lINE  Of  DEfENSE:  CUTTINg  ShORT-TERM  INTEREST  RaTES.  Con-
sider the response of the government to a negative shock, re
t < - r (where - r 
is the steady-state value for re
t), which for simplicity is assumed to be inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). One could interpret this exog-
enous disturbance term as the real interest rate in the first-best equilibrium 
(but with G ˆ
t = 0, price rigidities can cause the equilibrium to move away 
from the first-best state). For simplicity, hold the future fixed at steady state 
so that Etpt+1 = Et ˆ Yt+1 = 0. If the interest rate is held constant, this negative 
shock reduces  ˆ Yt by equation 1 and triggers deflation by equation 2. A 
quick review of equations 1 through 3 suggests, however, that the shock 
can be offset by cutting the nominal interest rate one for one; that is, it = 
r e
t. Given this response, and moving to  ˆ Gt, the objective (expression 4) 
can then be maximized simply by setting  ˆ Gt = 0. In other words, the first 
line of defense should be one-for-one interest rate cuts to offset the shock, 
with government spending set at its optimal steady-state level (determined 
2.  For simplicity I expand the model around a first-best steady state. To achieve this 
steady state, one needs to achieve the first best by introducing subsidies that do away with 
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by the steady relationship - uc = - wG; that is, fiscal policy is set according to 
what Mankiw and Weinzierl call “classical principles,” where the marginal 
utility of public spending is equated to the marginal utility of private spend-
ing). By setting the instruments in this way, the government achieves the 
first-best allocation where  ˆ Gt = Y ˆ
t = pt = 0.
Some special conditions are required for this result to hold. But I think 
the gist of it is correct and that it applies quite broadly.3 It seems rather natu-
ral to me to respond to temporary variations in the “efficient rate of interest” 
by varying the nominal interest rate, rather than by changing the size of the 
government over the business cycle. In the model above, this result holds for 
a variety of shocks, be they shocks to preferences or productivity shocks. It 
is also irrelevant here that r e
t was assumed to be i.i.d. in the example above; 
the result extends to a general stochastic process for re
t. Clearly, however, 
the first line of defense fails when the shock is large enough so that re
t < 0, 
as this would violate the zero bound on the short-term nominal interest rate.
ThE  SECOND  lINE  Of  DEfENSE:  CUTTINg  lONg-TERM  INTEREST  RaTES. 
Although the first line of defense is identical in the standard New Keynesian 
model and in the current paper, some differences start to emerge when the 
second line of defense is considered, and this is one reason why it is worth 
contrasting these two models. Mankiw and Weinzierl argue that once the zero 
bound on the short-term interest rate is binding, the natural thing to do next 
is to reduce long-term rates in both models. As stressed in Eggertsson and 
Michael Woodford (2003), this policy is identical to making a commitment 
about lowering future short-term rates, since long-term rates in the model are 
equal to the average of current and future short-term rates. Within the context 
of the model the authors present, there is no reason to doubt that the govern-
ment can—and should—do this. In the New Keynesian model, however, the 
limitations of this approach become a bit clearer. Why? Because there is an 
inherent credibility problem with the government committing to low future 
short-term rates in the model above. This credibility problem results from 
the fact that prices are set at staggered intervals, as opposed to just once, one 
period in advance, as in Mankiw and Weinzierl’s paper, and this implies that 
the welfare function (expression 4) penalizes actual inflation.
Consider a policy that maximizes the objective in expression 4 subject 
to the constraints laid out in equations 1 through 3. Consider now a shock 
3.  Most importantly here, I have assumed steady-state subsidies that do away with 
the distortions associated with monopoly. If those were kept in place, we would be in the 
world of second-best, with an inefficient steady state, and the logic would be a bit more 
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r
e
t = r
e
L < 0 in period 0 that reverts to a steady state of r
e
t = - r > 0 with prob-
ability µ in every period. This is the problem studied in Eggertsson (2001) 
and in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). My figure 1 illustrates the opti-
mal commitment by showing the behavior of the endogenous variables for 
one particular realization of r e
t, namely, when it reverts to steady state in 
period 15, taken from Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). As can be seen, 
the optimal commitment in the New Keynesian model is to commit to a 
future output boom and inflation once the shock is over, in order to reduce 
the output contraction and deflation at the time of the shock. The central 
bank achieves this, as can be seen in the top panel, by committing to keep-
ing the short-term nominal interest rate at zero for several periods after the 
economy has reverted to steady state. If the government is a discretionary 
policymaker, however, this is not credible. Why? Simply because the gov-
ernment has an incentive to renege on its promise to allow inflation and an 
output boom once the shock is over. At that time it can achieve zero infla-
tion and a zero output gap going forward, and thus achieve the first-best 
state from that time on, whereas the commitment equilibrium implies a 
welfare loss at that time (which the government is willing to incur in order 
to get a better outcome while trapped). The dashed line in figure 1 shows 
the optimal policy under discretion, where the government is unable to 
make any commitments about future nominal short-term rates, and as the 
figure reveals, this outcome is highly suboptimal.
When I first studied this credibility problem as a graduate student, I 
liked to refer to it as an application of “the fable of the fox and the lion.” A 
lion falls into a deep trap and cannot get out. A fox passes by, and the lion 
promises the fox that it will hunt any other animal in the forest and give it 
to the fox for dinner, if the fox will help it out of the trap. The fox, how-
ever, understands that once it has saved the lion, the lion has no incentive 
to fulfill its promise and instead, being quite hungry after sitting for so long 
in the trap, will eat the fox for dinner. The result, then, is that the fox walks 
on its merry way, while the lion starves to death, unable to credibly commit 
to the future action that would save it. In this example, as with the central 
bank in the liquidity trap, the problem is attenuated by the fact that getting 
oneself in a trap is a relatively rare event, so that it is difficult to establish a 
reputation for dealing with it as promised. Moreover, the solution involves 
promising things in the future that are not consistent with how the lion 
(or the central bank) has behaved in the past, and at the time the promise is 
made, no particular action is required, only words.
In summary, the New Keynesian model confirms the second line of 
defense proposed by Mankiw and Weinzierl but adds the wrinkle that it COMMENTS and DISCUSSION  259
Figure 1.  Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment and under Discretion in the 
New Keynesian Model
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involves a relatively serious credibility problem for policymakers. This 
leads to the third line of defense.
ThE  ThIRD  lINE  Of  DEfENSE:  ChaNgINg  SPENDINg  INCENTIvES  ThROUgh 
TaxES.  The third line of defense is to use tax incentives to increase private 
spending. The authors here mostly discuss how tax changes can affect pri-
vate investment. It might be useful to clarify this logic within the context 
of the framework presented above, where I have in fact abstracted from 
investment altogether. In principle, there is nothing special here about 
investment. The problem in a liquidity trap is a collapse in private spend-
ing, and thus any component of spending—investment or consumption—
can in principle be increased to offset it.
Let us add to the model above a tax on consumption tc (which is levied 
exclusive of the posted sticky price) and a tax on labor tw. In this case equa-
tions 1 and 2 become
( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 5 1 1 Y Y i r t t t t t t t
e
t t
c
t = − − − ( ) − − + + E E E E σ π τ τt t
c
+ ( ) 1
( ) ˆ 6 π κ βE  π t t t Y = +   ˆ ˆ
1 κ τ τ t t
c
t
w + + ( ) +
Interestingly, as discussed in Eggertsson and Woodford (2006), this extension 
does not change the second-order approximation of utility in expression 4. 
What this extension shows is that the first-best solution can now be imple-
mented by cutting sales taxes in response to the shock, while simultaneously 
increasing labor taxes. In particular, as pointed out by Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2006), if the tax instruments above are available to the govern-
ment, the first-best equilibrium can be replicated by setting taxes as follows:
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The intuition for this result is simple. The problem once the zero bound 
is binding is that there is not enough private spending. It is exactly for 
that reason that nominal interest rate cuts are helpful: they make spending 
today cheaper relative to spending tomorrow. When interest rate cuts are 
no longer feasible, the incentive to spend today rather than in the future 
can instead be created by reducing the sales tax. This, however, has an 
additional effect: it gives people the incentive to work more today, thus 
triggering deflationary pressures by reducing real wages and so reducing 
the marginal costs faced by firms. It is to offset this deflationary effect that COMMENTS and DISCUSSION  261
an increase in labor taxes is also called for: this works in an inflationary 
direction, thus replicating the first-best state. As a side benefit, the policy 
is deficit neutral. The result that Mankiw and Weinzierl derive is similar to 
this one, except that they focus on how the government can affect another 
component of private spending, namely, investment.4
The first point I want to emphasize in this context is that using tax incen-
tives in this way is perfectly consistent with old-style Keynesian econom-
ics: it was, for example, a theme in an early Brookings Paper by Franco 
Modigliani and Charles Steindel (1977). In this respect there is nothing 
unconventional about this policy. Tax incentives here work mainly by 
increasing aggregate spending. The more substantive issue, I suspect, is 
that some important limitations on variations in taxes are likely to make 
this third line of defense insufficient.
With respect to the simple example from Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2006), for example, the political and physical constraints are somewhat 
obvious in the U.S. context. Sales taxes are levied at the state level, and 
hence a coordinated temporary cut would be challenging. Moreover, as a 
practical matter, there may also be a zero bound on sales taxes: it is difficult 
to imagine a negative sales tax (that is, a subsidy on consumption goods), 
since people could then profit from buying and selling the same items over 
and over. Are there any limits on investment tax credits as a solution to an 
economy-wide demand contraction? My conjecture is that the answer is 
yes. To start with, these credits are most commonly implemented by allow-
ing firms to deduct investment expenditures from taxes paid on profits. In a 
deep recession, however, profits may be low or nonexistent, thus blunting 
the impact of the credit. In theory, of course, one can imagine many ways 
to get around this, but as a practical matter it may not be so simple. More-
over, investment spending is usually financed with money borrowed from 
banks. The collapse in investment during a crisis is usually due in part to 
the fact that the interest rate at which firms can borrow becomes very high, 
even if the risk-free interest rate falls to zero. This increase in spreads may 
be prohibitively large, because of both default risk and a liquidity premium, 
and thus even a very aggressive tax credit may not stimulate investment 
enough to stabilize the economy.
Yet another limitation of investment tax credits is worth mentioning. 
In the authors’ model, the economy is depressed in the first period but is 
assumed to return to full employment in the second. Investment in the first 
4.  Correia and others (2011) show how the result above extends to the fully nonlinear 
model and how it applies once investment is introduced in the model.262  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
period is then useful in the second period, when the economy is operating 
at capacity. In a depression, however, the investment decisions facing firms 
may be quite different from those in normal times. In particular, one can 
imagine that in many cases the firms making the investments anticipate 
that the recession will still be in full swing by the time the invested capital 
can be used for production. In an economy that is expected to be operating 
below capacity for some time, then, it might be difficult to give firms strong 
enough incentives to invest.5
To sum up, it seems far from clear at the moment that the U.S. tax sys-
tem is flexible enough to eliminate a large contraction in demand. This 
leads to the fourth and last line of defense.
ThE fOURTh lINE Of DEfENSE: gOvERNMENT SPENDINg.  In discussing this 
last line of defense, rather than study isolated experiments, it might be 
interesting to explain what the fully optimal government spending profile 
looks like when no other fiscal instruments are available for stabilization 
apart from the nominal interest rate (hence taxes are lump sum). I find 
this helpful to give further insight into how this policy might work in this 
class of models. I think it also clarifies some important advantages of fiscal 
policy over monetary policy, in that it is less subject to the dynamic incon-
sistency problem illustrated in the fable about the fox and the lion.
The optimal fiscal policy under commitment can be found by maximiz-
ing expression 4 subject to equations 1 through 3. This gives rise to the 
following first-order conditions:
( ) 7 0 2 2
1
1 1 π ψ ψ β σψ t t t t + − − =
−
−
( )
^
8 0 1
1
1 1 2 λ ψ β ψ κψ Y t t t t Y + − − =
−
−
( )
^
9 0 1
1
1 1 2 λ ψ β ψ ψ δκ G t t t t G − + − =
−
−
( ) , , , 10 0 0 0 1 1 ψ ψ t t t i i ≥ ≥ =
where y1 and y2 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with each con-
straint as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and the last set of conditions 
are the complementary slackness conditions. This is a natural generaliza-
tion of that paper, extended to include government spending, but spending 
is determined by the first-order condition in equation 9.
5.  Eggertsson (2011) studies the effect of investment credits in an economy where the 
zero bound is binding for several periods. The result suggests that, despite the possibility 
of multiple-period recessions, this policy can still be quite effective at increasing demand.COMMENTS and DISCUSSION  263
Figure 2 shows the optimal commitment when the government can use 
both interest rates and government spending to stabilize output in response 
to a negative shock re
L < 0 that reverts to steady state with 10 percent prob-
ability in each period. The figure shows the contingency in the case where 
the shock reverts to steady state in period 15. The calibration is the same as 
in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), except that it allows for government 
spending corresponding to 20 percent of output in steady state.6
Figure 2.  Optimal Monetary and fiscal Policy under Commitment Compared with Use 
of Monetary Policy Only
6.  Here k = 0.02, s = 0.5, b = 0.99, r
e
L = -0.02/4, d = 2/3, µ = 0.1, lY = 0.0025, lG = 
0.000329, and G
–
/Y
–
 = 0.2.
Source: Author’s model described in the text.
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As the figure reveals, optimal government spending policy in this case 
is to not only increase spending during the period of the shock, but also 
to commit to contracting spending once the economy has recovered. The 
intuition for this result is as follows. As equation 1 shows, demand can be 
increased either by increasing government consumption today or by com-
mitting to reduce the size of the government in the future. The increase 
in government spending today increases aggregate demand today directly 
through the aggregate resource constraint (Y = C + G). The commitment 
to reduce the size of the government in the future, however, works some-
what differently. It stimulates aggregate spending today by stimulating pri-
vate consumption today. Why does cutting future government spending 
increase consumption today? Because the anticipation of a smaller govern-
ment in the future leaves more room for private consumption in the future; 
that is, it increases future income and consumption. This, in turn, works to 
increase current consumption, as consumers try to smooth consumption 
over time, and the higher future income and consumption thus stimulate 
current consumption according to the consumption Euler equation. The fig-
ure suggests, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that this second effect is the 
more important of the two under the optimal commitment in this numerical 
example.7
Committing to a smaller government in the future once the shocks 
have subsided suffers from the same problem as the optimal monetary 
commitment:  it  is  not  credible.  The  government  has  an  incentive  to 
promise a future retrenchment and then renege on the promise, setting 
the size of government at its first-best level as soon as the adverse shock 
has subsided. This is shown in figure 3, which illustrates the optimal 
policy under discretion. As the figure reveals, as soon as the shock is 
over,  the  government  will  keep  spending  at  its  steady-state  optimal 
level. Meanwhile, government spending is not subject to any zero bound 
during the period of the shock. This makes all the difference. We see 
that because of this, government spending increases quite dramatically, 
thus eliminating the disastrous outcome that occurs if the government 
uses monetary policy alone. The government increases its spending by 
about 6 percent and as a result eliminates the drop in output (which was 
about 14 percent), suggesting a “multiplier” of more than 2: every dollar 
7.  There is a bit of a difference between the standard New Keynesian model and Mankiw 
and Weinzierl’s paper here, as in their case a permanent increase in government spending is 
also expansionary. I will not dwell on this difference since I suspect it is a relatively special 
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spent in the recessionary state creates more than 2 dollars of output in 
that state.
CONClUSION.  The way I think of multipliers is as a comparative statistic. 
A multiplier indicates what happens to y if x is increased, holding every-
thing else constant. This can make sense only within the context of specific 
examples where such comparisons are meaningful. The authors argue that 
those statistics can be misleading if one wants to make welfare compari-
sons. A policy with a low multiplier is not necessarily better than one with 
a high multiplier. This is certainly correct, as Mankiw and Weinzierl’s 
numerical examples illustrate. Nevertheless, I think the best that policy 
Figure 3.  Optimal Monetary and fiscal Policy under Discretion Compared with Use 
of Monetary Policy Only
Source: Author’s model described in the text.
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can do at the moment is, first, to identify clearly what the problem is, and 
second, to identify in broad-brush terms what can be done about it. With 
respect to certain policies, I think the best one can do at the moment is to 
simply identify the basic directions of their effects. Does increasing gov-
ernment spending in the short run help? What about increasing government 
spending in the long run? What about a variety of tax cuts? What should be 
the role of a balanced budget in the short, medium, and long run? Unfor-
tunately, I think the economy is still so far from its first-best state, and our 
understanding of policy is so weak, that we need to be content with finding 
these basic signs. And here I think multipliers can be helpful summary 
statistics that can get quite close to the heart of the matter. After all, as the 
authors (citing Arthur Okun) remind us, it takes a lot of Harberger triangles 
to fill an Okun’s gap.
My overall impression about the policy debate during this episode is 
that it has not been so much about whether to use tax credits or government 
spending to increase demand, or whether committing to some degree of 
inflation would have helped. Instead, it seems to me, the debate has been 
about whether “aggregate demand management” is a useful concept in the 
first place. Hence, perhaps the debate has not been as focused as it should 
have been on how exactly aggregate demand should be increased. This 
paper is a step in that direction, and I think it is the right step. At this stage, 
I think it is of considerable value to illuminate the basic forces at work. 
Much remains to be learned about the details of the tax code before we can 
claim to fully understand demand management.
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GeneRAL  DISCUSSIon    David  Romer  applauded  the  authors  for 
approaching countercyclical policy in terms of its welfare implications, and 
for tailoring their model to the question at hand rather than bringing in a lot 
of superfluous apparatus. In his view a question was whether the authors’ 
results were merely illustrative, showing what happens under a particular 
set of assumptions, or robust across a wide range of scenarios. The test was 
whether one could come up with a realistic scenario in which conventional 
fiscal policy would rank higher on the list of policy options. In one possible 
scenario, not far removed from actual recent events, the adverse shock stems 
from a general realization that the housing stock has been overbuilt. In such 
a scenario one would want to apply fiscal stimulus, in the form of increased 
government  consumption  and  investment,  to  encourage  the  production 
of goods and services other than housing. The authors’ model, however, 
assumed perfect substitutability between government and private capital, 
which seemed to Romer the wrong way to proceed. Romer also argued that 
it was wrong to characterize, as the paper implicitly did, the recent fiscal 
stimulus as $800 billion of government consumption spending. 
Christopher Sims described the authors’ model as one that combines a 
government budget constraint with a simple fiscal equation in which all 
taxes are lump sum. That enforces the connection between monetary and 
fiscal policy. Thus, the monetary policy actions analyzed in the paper could 
equally well be described as a sequence of choices of the level of revenue, 
with accounting identities then forcing corresponding movements in the 
money supply and investment. 
A conventional assumption, Sims noted, is that the monetary authorities 
have a commitment technology that enables them to choose a course of 
action and stick to it, and then fiscal policy can be described as instantly 
and automatically adjusting the lump-sum tax to validate the chosen time 
path of monetary policy. But one could flip that model around to make 
fiscal policy unpredictable and difficult to reverse and monetary policy 
changeable and to some extent rational. One can then ask what happens 
under the further assumption that, in the end, monetary policy has to do 
whatever is necessary to be consistent with fiscal policy. It turns out that 
the optimal policy, at least in simpler versions of the model, is to cut taxes 
in the first period, forcing the monetary authorities to lower interest rates, 
thus increasing employment.
Martin Baily congratulated the authors for the paper’s remarkably clear 
exposition but suggested that its very clarity made some apparent idiosyn-
crasies of its model stand out all the more. First, the model has no financial 
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when the financial sector essentially froze up. The idea that in such a situa-
tion an investment tax credit would have turned investment around, or that 
lowering interest rates would have turned consumption around, seemed to 
Baily fanciful. 
Another idiosyncrasy, Baily continued, was the paper’s use of an extremely 
simple quantity equation. Baily felt that such a simple equation made it 
almost impossible to do any interesting macroeconomics, because it omitted 
most of what matters. Laurence Ball added that in his view the implication 
of the paper’s quantity equation—that a larger money supply automatically 
led to higher nominal spending, without any invocation of an interest rate 
or other channel—was theoretically arbitrary and not supported empirically. 
As he saw it, the burden of proof was on the authors to show that such a 
linkage exists, rather than on others to cite counterexamples.
John Haltiwanger followed up on Olivier Blanchard’s distinction between 
the natural level of output and the optimal, distortion-free level of output.   
A key theme in international comparative studies that he and others had 
been pursuing was that various types of misallocation of resources account 
for many of the differences observed across countries. In a healthy advanced 
economy like the United States, there is less misallocation because the econ-
omy is constantly reinventing itself through creative destruction. Recently, 
however, the wheels have come off this process, Haltiwanger argued: the 
massive destruction caused by the financial crisis has not been followed by 
a wave of creative investment. Instead, uncertainty about what was coming 
next led businesses and investors to move to the sidelines. That uncertainty 
arose precisely because a serious misallocation had occurred, and it was 
unclear what policy could or would do to rectify the situation.
In  such  a  case,  Haltiwanger  continued,  one  option  is  to  do  what 
Blanchard had suggested, that is, a bit of everything, fiscal and monetary. 
But Haltiwanger feared that such an approach might actually worsen 
allocative distortions, just as the easy money policy after the 2001 recession   
had led to a misallocation of investment toward certain kinds of activity—
housing in particular—thus sowing the seeds for the problems that exploded 
so spectacularly a few years later.
Michael Woodford was sympathetic with most of the paper but was 
uncomfortable with its treatment of the so-called second line of defense. 
The paper left the impression that the Federal Reserve was perfectly willing, 
if necessary, to go beyond conventional interest rate policy and promise future 
policies that would deliver inflation, but in the recent crisis the Fed had in 
fact stated explicitly that it would not tolerate even a temporary rise in infla-
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constraints on the Federal Reserve, the paper made it appear plausible that 
fiscal policy—specifically, increased government purchases—need not be 
part of the response. A further constraint on the effectiveness of this second 
line of defense was the question of whether the public could be induced to 
believe in the central bank’s commitment to using it.
Phillip Swagel commented on one practical difficulty with an invest-
ment tax credit, namely, that like other business tax credits, it would pre-
sumably not be made refundable. Consequently, only profitable firms could 
use the credit, and because many firms are not profitable in a recession, 
the effect of the credit would be blunted. The same held for policies that 
allowed immediate expensing of capital investment.
Swagel recalled that these issues had come up at the Treasury when the 
administration was trying to design what became the stimulus package of 
early 2008. Large-scale spending initiatives were viewed as likely to be 
wasteful, and increased expensing was expected to have a modest impact, 
for the reason already given. So the decision was made to give tax rebates, 
whose impact is still being debated. The idea of having the Treasury buy 
mortgage-backed securities from the government-sponsored enterprises in 
order to lower mortgage interest rates was also considered in the fall of 2008; 
this was permitted under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act passed in 
the summer of 2008. In the end, this was done instead by the Federal Reserve. 
Justin Wolfers pointed out that the authors’ model was very much in the 
spirit of Robert Lucas’s 2003 American Economic Association presidential 
address, which argued that the welfare effects of business cycles are clearly 
second-order phenomena. To Wolfers that seemed to make the model an 
odd choice for an analysis of how to offset business cycles. In addition, the 
paper’s argument against active fiscal policy was not that it is incapable of 
closing an Okun’s gap, the gap between actual and potential output, but that 
in doing so it creates Harberger triangles, that is, deadweight losses from 
the distortions caused by government intervention. If macroeconomists are 
right that Harberger triangles are generally small relative to an Okun’s gap, 
that seemed to undermine the authors’ objection. Finally, Wolfers argued 
that the reason that monetary policy in the model does not also produce 
Harberger triangles is that the model has only one consumption good. If 
instead it had two consumption goods, one with sticky prices and one with 
flexible prices, then monetary policy, too, would create Harberger triangles, 
and the question would become whether monetary or fiscal policy created 
the larger ones, and the answer to that is not obvious.
The discussion of alternative macroeconomic stabilization tools on the 
fiscal side reminded Steven Davis of Singapore’s Central Provident Fund, 270  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2011
a large, government-run mandatory saving program to which workers and 
their employers each contribute up to 20 percent of the worker’s earnings. 
From time to time, in response to adverse shocks, Singapore has adjusted 
these rates sharply downward. Thus, although these contributions are not, 
strictly speaking, taxes, they can be seen as an instrument of fiscal policy, 
helping alleviate liquidity constraints for both workers and businesses 
during downturns, and so resemble the more targeted kind of fiscal policy 
alternatives that Blanchard had discussed. 
Davis noted that some U.S. federal programs do this kind of targeting to 
some extent: unemployment insurance, for example, helps the financially 
constrained families of unemployed workers smooth their consumption. If 
one believes that fiscal policy should do more such targeting, one poten-
tially effective way might to be to redesign the unemployment insurance 
system so that it also offers loans at subsidized interest rates to those eligible.
Robert Gordon, observing that the discussion had so far focused on 
demand shocks, sought to introduce some symmetry by raising the issue of 
adverse supply shocks in a world with either nominal or real wage rigidity.   
The kind of supply shock most familiar to Americans is an oil price shock, 
which, Gordon noted, happened to approximate the kind of two-good model 
that Wolfers had mentioned, in which one good (oil) has freely flexible prices 
while the other (labor) has a sticky price. Such a shock can present monetary 
policy with a dilemma that has nothing to do with the zero lower bound on 
interest rates. The central bank must in that case choose some combination 
of a decline in output below potential and higher inflation, and even then, if 
cost-of-living escalators are prevalent, it cannot accommodate inflation and 
must instead adopt the corner solution of letting the Okun gap widen. 
If, Gordon continued, there were already a high energy tax in place, as 
in many European countries today, and if the oil price shock were not too 
large, then an alternative, targeted fiscal policy might be to lower the energy 
tax to offset the rise in the oil price. The question then would become how 
to pay for that tax cut so as to maintain budget neutrality, and the answer 
presumably would be some kind of broad-based lump-sum tax or increase 
in the income tax. An additional, complementary policy when cost-of-living 
escalators are a problem is simply to prohibit them. Citing other recent 
work by Blanchard that sought to explain why recent oil shocks have caused 
so much less economic damage than those of the 1970s, Gordon suggested 
that part of the answer was that cost-of-living provisions are less pervasive 
today than they were then.
Donald  Kohn  followed  up  on  Martin  Baily’s  observation  that  the 
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model might be useful in analyzing the recession that had followed the 
dot-com crash but would likely not be so useful in understanding the 2007–09 
recession. In particular, because the model lumps together government and 
private consumption in a single consumption measure, it might not accu-
rately portray an economy in which financial constraints bind differently 
on households than on the government. Introducing a financial sector might 
not change the authors’ ranking of policy options, but some sense of how 
financial markets fit in would surely be useful.
Kohn also wondered how, if the authors’ ranking was correct, one might 
justify the countercyclical measures that, as Swagel had noted, the admin-
istration had introduced in the spring of 2008, when interest rates were 
still above zero. One possible justification was the one that Blanchard had 
mentioned, that the uncertainties facing policymakers argued for trying a 
bit of everything. But another was the differences in lags between monetary 
and fiscal policy. If a piece of stimulus legislation can be pushed through 
Congress quickly, its effects might be felt sooner than those of a change in 
the federal funds rate.
Another challenge with monetary policy, Kohn noted, was the difficulty 
of communicating a commitment to keeping a future interest rate when that 
action is by nature conditional. When there is widespread uncertainty about 
where the economy is headed and what will need to be done down the road, 
such a commitment may need to be broken. Undoing any premature com-
mitment could be very hard.
Finally, Kohn addressed the idea that, during a severe downturn, the 
central bank should commit to higher inflation. He felt that such a strategy 
made less sense in the real world than in economists’ models. In the models, 
expectations are formed rationally, and when the central bank makes and 
announces a commitment, the commitment is believed. In fact, little is really 
known about how inflation expectations are formed or what the costs are of 
letting expectations become unanchored.
Benjamin Friedman suggested that the authors state more specifically 
what kind of investment they would favor if it did prove necessary to resort 
to countercyclical fiscal policy. Since much investment is by households, 
would they approve of tax subsidies to buy automobiles? Or subsidies for 
home ownership beyond those already in the tax code? 
Friedman also asked the authors to specify whether the variable M in 
their equations represented deposits or reserves. The paper indicated that 
M is money held by households, that is, deposits, but the ability to use 
unconventional monetary policy depended on the model’s proposition 
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chooses. If M is deposits, that implies that the central bank can somehow 
induce banks to lend, because that, after all, is how deposits are created. So 
the model seemed to beg the question of whether unconventional monetary 
policy can work: if the central bank is assumed to be able to make banks 
lend, then it is not surprising that unconventional policy works. But that is 
an assumption, not the conclusion of any analysis; to “conclude” from the 
model that unconventional monetary policy is effective is at best misleading. 
Friedman suspected that introducing even a very simple banking system 
into the model would clarify the matter—and would lead to unconventional 
monetary policy emerging far less powerful than the authors claimed.
Eric Swanson cited the authors’ statement, early in the paper, that labor 
could be added to the model in various ways but would not substantially 
affect the model’s equations, and he pointed out that, in contrast, how labor 
is introduced would affect the welfare implications. He noted that the 
authors’ simple model implied that more unemployment was actually wel-
fare enhancing, holding consumption fixed, which raises important issues 
about the usefulness of the authors’ welfare criterion. Indeed, traditional 
measures of “bang for the buck” might still be preferable.
George Perry questioned the authors’ claim that monetary policy does 
not create distortions but that fiscal policy that changes government spend-
ing does. Perry believed that monetary policy does create distortions if it 
works, because part of the mechanism by which it works is the exchange 
rate. If the rest of the world is facing much the same economic conditions, 
then aggressive use of monetary policy by the United States must surely 
have a distorting, beggar-thy-neighbor effect. In contrast, a change in govern-
ment spending by one country benefits all.
Perry agreed with Woodford and Kohn that it was hard for a central 
bank to convince the public that it was committed to raising inflation. But 
he went further, reasoning that, to the extent that some parts of the market 
reacted, the effect was likely to be perverse. Financial market professionals 
who do the lending have sharp antennae and are quick to detect and react to 
changing prospects for inflation. Other businesses and the general public—
the potential borrowers—are less likely to respond. So if a central bank 
promise of higher inflation influences anyone, it is more likely to be banks 
and other lenders rather than their potential borrowers. Such an asymmetry 
would lead to less rather than more borrowing and spending.